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1. SUMMARY.
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of petr's policy of refusing the _press (or anyone else) access
to the prison to observe conditions, interview inmates, or
take photographs.

KQED's interest in obtaining access to the

jail arose from a prison psychiatrist's report that conditions
in the prison were responsible in part for a prisoner's suicide.
After the suit was filed, petr initiated a series of guided
tours of the prison for the public.

'

At first the tours were

given monthly on a first-come first-serve basis and were limited
to 25 persons;

the tours for 1975 were filled within a week.*

The tourists did not see all the prison (the allegedly notorious
"Little Greystone" building and the "disciplinary cells" were
excluded), were not allowed to speak to inmates, and were

~

not permitted to take photographs.
_offer a set a photographs for sale.)

(The sheriff, however, did
Representatives of the

press were permitted on the tours only if they signed up in
time, which did not permit the press access in resp~nse to
a newsworthy event.

And, of course, the lack of opportunity

to photograph conditions and interview inmates made the tours
inadequate for media purposes.
Petr emphasizes that there is some access to information about
the prison that is extended to the public and press on equal
terms:

First, there is no limit on the mail that an inmate can

send or receive.

Second, sentenced inmates may pe visited

for a 3-hour period on each Sunday;

•·

the only restriction on

visitors concerns juveniles and those previously incarcerated.
Third, inmates in the maximum security facility may make unmonitore

* Petr indicates that in 1976 the tours were given semi-monthly
and were expanded to 30 persons. Petr claims there has been
"essentially" no waiting list for the tours. Petn at 7.

'

~

-

.
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collect calls without restriction.

Fourth, there are the

public tours, described above.
The DC entered a preliminary injunction ordering the petr
to allow "full and accurate coverage of the conditions"
in the prison by KQED and other respons ible representatives
of the news media.

The press was to be given access to all

Santa Rita facilities "at reasonable times and hours,"

and

were to be allowed to use sound and photographic equipment and
to interview inmates.

The petr was allowed to exclude the press,

however, "for the limited periods when tensions in the jail
make such media access dangerous."

~

I

CA 9 affirmed.

The panel found somewhat of a stumbling block

the Court's observation in Pell v. Procuni.er, 417 ~ .s. 817,-

; 834 (1974), that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access

to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general
public."

Tllre panel decision by DJ Pendergast took the approach {

that the DC had impl i citly found that the rights
of- both the

·

public and the press were infringed by the petr's policies.
In his view,

Ml

did not require that equal access be implemented

identically for press and public and hence the DC did not err
in referring only to the press in its preliminary order.

Judge

Duniway, concurring, found the language ·from Pell troubling, but
observed that the law ought to recognize that the administrative
problems associated with the admission of the press are

e

different from those governing the public.

Judge Hufstedler,

concurring specially, indicates that although ~he press has no .

> •

-

l
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right to information barred from the public generally,
regulations may appropriately differentiate between public
and press with regard to the means by which information

to which the public is entitled is gathered.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist granted a stay of the preliminary
injunction on request of the petr pending the disposition of
the instant petn, noting ' the "departure from the unequivocal
language of one of our opinions which on its fac e appears to
govern the question."
3.

CONTENTIONS.

Petr argues that the DC and the CA

departed from the teaching of Pell and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), in extending the press

~

greater access to the prison than that provided to the public.
Petr claims that the public access allowed by mail, telephone,
visits to inmates, and the public tours is adequate to satisfy
the public's need to know.

Requiring further access might

disrupt the prison.
Respsargue

that neither Pell nor Saxbe is in conflict with

the decision below; both dealt only with a prison rule
prohibiting interviews with specific individual inmates, an
issue not involved here.

Moreover, in Pell the Court noted

that the public and press were given "full opporturiity" to
observe prison conditions; newsmen could visit both the
maximum and minimum security sections and could interview

-

randomly selected inmates.

417 U.S., at 830.

In Saxbe

the Court emphasized the "substantial access" allowed the

. ..
,-9

t

) ..

-

I,.,

-
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members of the press to observe ~nd to report conditions;
ne~smen could tour and photograph the facilities and could
interview the inmates they encountered.

417 U.S., at 847.

Resps , also , note that several other jails in the area have
free press access and that the access . has created no problems.
Finally, resps . note that the injunction is only a preliminary
order and the difficulties, if any, in allowing press access
may serve to alter the issue before the litigation goes to
final judgment.
4.

DISCUSSION.

The preliminary injunction does seem

contrary to the observation in Pell that the newsgathering
rights of the press are no greater than those of the public.

t!

However, both Saxbe and Pell
- may be impliedly limited to
situations in which there is already substantial press
and public access to information.

If so, this case

presents a very different issue than that considered in those
cases in light of the limited access to Santa Rita.
If one assumes that the public has a right to know about
.prison conditions, · - <' .: : . ~.-,_, v the . suggestion that the
means of access to that information provided the press may
differ from those extended the public seems a sensible response
to the practicalities of the situation to me.
There is a response.

-
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BENCH MEMO

To: Mr. Justice Powell

November 27, 1977

From: Jim Alt
No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the
Court held that prison regulations prohibiting news
reporters from conducting face-to-face interviews with
inmates of their choice did not violate either the
prisoners' or the reporters' First Amendment rights.

The

Court's rationale for the second branch of its holding was
that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general
public." 417 U.S., at 834: accord, Saxbe v. Washington

-

-

Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).

-

-

2.

Because the general

public was not permitted to interview selected inmates,
newsmen did not have a First Amendment right to do so.
You wrote a strong dissent on this point, arguing
that the "constitutionally established role of the news
media" is to "act[ ] as an agent of the public at large"
in gathering and reporting the news; that reporters, as
agents for the public, therefore have a right to greater
access to prisons than the public at large, which
necessarily is excluded from prisons; and that limitations
on that right intended to protect legitimate needs of the
prison must be no more restrictive of the reporters' First
Amendment function than is necessary to protect those

-

needs.

Saxbe, supra, at 850-875 (Powell, J. dissenting).
In the instant case, the DC ordered the Sheriff

of Alameda County, California, to grant "responsible
representatives of the news media" access to the county
jail at Santa Rita "at reasonable times and hours," and to
permit those representatives to use "photographic and
sound equipment" and to interview inmates, so that the
media could provide "full and accurate coverage of the
Santa Rita facilities." Pet.App. at 27-28.

The court

order allows the Sheriff to deny access during "those
limited periods when tensions in the jail make such media
access dangerous," id. at 28, and the DC opinion states
that the "specific methods of implementing" press access

-

should be determined by the Sheriff and not the court. Id.
at 33.

-

-

-

3.

At the time the DC issued its order, the general

public's access to the Santa Rita jail consisted of one
tour a month for a group of 25 people, with reservations
on a first-come, first-served basis.

Members of the tours

were not permitted to take any pictures or to speak with
any inmates.

Thus, on its face, the DC order grants

newsmen a "right of access to prisons [and] their inmates
beyond that afforded the general public," in apparent
disregard of Pell and Saxbe.

CA9 nonetheless upheld the

order, with each of three judges on the panel writing
separately.

Id. at 1-4 (Pregerson, District Judge), 21-22

(Duniway, Circuit Judge), 23-26 (Hufstedler, Circuit
Judge).

-

The question for the Court, to my mind, is
whether the facts of this case differ so compellingly from
the facts of Pell and Saxbe as to justify distinguishing
those cases here.

Most of this memo therefore will be

devoted to considering the various distinctions offered by
the respondents here and the courts below.

If this case

is not fairly distinguishable from Pell and Saxbe, the
question for you will become whether to adhere to the
position you took in those cases.
I. DISTINGUISHING PELL AND SAXBE.

A. There is less press access to the jail here

than in Pell and Saxbe.

-

Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for

the Court in Pell, began his discussion of the reporters'
arguments in favor of a First Amendment right to conduct

- f--t-»-

-

-

4.

face-to-face interviews with prisoners this way:
"We note at the outset that this regulation
[banning face-to-face interviews with selected
inmates] is not part of an attempt by the State
to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to
frustrate the press' investigation and reporting
of those conditions.
Indeed, the record
demonstrates that, under current corrections
policy, both the press and the g eneral p ublic are
accorded - full - opportunit i es to observe pr1s d n
conditions. The Department of Corrections
regularly conducts tours through the prisons for
L- the benefit of interested citizens. In addition,
e,y news,m,e n ~ re 2ermit ted t o ~ isit both the maximum
secur i ty and mi n i mum securit y sections of the
institutions and to stop and speak about any
subject to any inmates whom they might
encounter.
If security considerations permit,
corrections personnel will step aside to permit
such interviews to be confidential. Apart from
general access to all parts of the institutions,
newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons
to interview inmates selected at random by the
corrections officials. By the same token, if a
newsman wishes to write a story on a particular
prison program, he is permitted to sit in on
group meetings and to interview the inmate
participants.
In short, members of the press
enjoy access to California prisons that is not
available to other members of the public."

1

-

I

(!)(

417 U.S., at 830-831.

Justice Stewart made similar

observations about the public's and press' access to the
federal prisons involved in Saxbe. 417 U.S., at 847-848.
Respondents argue that th~s case differs from

-

-

Pell and Saxbe because neither the public nor the press is

...

given significant access to the Santa Rita jail.
___.....---...,

....., a w w w a ~

Indeed,

.-

there are strong indications that the Sheriff is trying
"to conceal the conditions in [the] prison [and] to
frustrate the press' investigation and reporting of those

-

conditions."

Consider these facts:

This lawsuit grew out of the Sheriff's refusal,

-

-

-

5.

as a matter of "policy," to allow the anchorman of
nonprofit TV station KQED's local news program to
investigate the circumstances and inspect the scene of a
suicide at the Santa Rita jail in March of 1975.

The

suicide took place inside a facility at Santa Rita called
"Greystone" where, in 1972, a federal court had found
conditions so "truly deplorable" as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.

Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp.

128, 132-133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

Having been rebuffed in

his attempt to gain access to the jail, the anchorman
tried without much success to cover the story of the
suicide by reporting on the county Board of Supervisors'
investigation of jail conditions and on a public debate on

-

whether to build a new jail.
Finally, on June 17, 1975, the anchorman filed

~

this lawsuit.

~ ~

general public was allowed any access whatever to the

~

At that time neither the press nor the

Santa Rita jail, although prisoners could receive personal
visitors for a few hours a week, could send and receive
mail, and could make some telephone calls.

But

miraculously, two days after the suit was filed, the
Sheriff submitted a plan to the Board of Supervisors to
take a group of 25 members of the general public through
the jail once a month.

But, respondents emphasize, even

this plan, which the Supervisors approved on June 14,

-

falls far short of providing either the public or the
press the degree of access the existence of which was

~
~3;:J

-

-

6.

emphasized so heavily in Pell and Saxbe.
First of all, members of the press still are all

--

------

but excluded from access to the jail by the tours'

......

--

first-come- first-served reservation policy.

..

The tours

were filled for six months within a week of their
announcement.

Moreover, neither the members of the press

who are lucky enough to get a reservation for a tour, nor
members of the general public who go on the tours, are
permited to speak with any inmates; to take any
photographs; or to view the infamous "Little Greystone"
facility.

In fact, the Sheriff requires that inmates be

be kept entirely out of sight of the tour members.

-

Although the Sheriff offers for sale a series of 20 photos

I

of the jail for $2 apiece, these photos were taken at
places and times selected by jail authorities, and they
cannot be expected fairly to depict typical conditions at
the jail.

And monthly tours cannot possibly enable the

press to cover stories at the jail as they break.
In view of all this, respondents argue, the
"Court's 'no special access to information' statement [in
Pell and Saxbe] must be read in the context of prisons
that already permitted very substantial press access." Br.
for Resps. at 29.

-

"[T]he no-interview rule in Pell and Saxbe was
upheld only on a record showing that reporters in
fact had substantial access to the prisons,
access reasonably sufficient to insure against
concealment of conditions or events of public
concern. As the district court noted in the
present case, the Pell-Saxbe access is precisely

-

-

-

7.

the same sought by KQED. Thus, KQED can be
granted all the relief it seeks and will have no
more access than the press had in Pell-Saxbe. The
district court order is consistent with the
holdings in those cases." (Br. for Resps. at
30-31) •
Petitioner's answer is twofold.

First, Pell and

Saxbe did lay down a rule of general applicability, that
the press is entitled to no greater access to prisons than
the public.

Even if the press has less access here than

it did in Pell and Saxbe, it is entitled to no more than
the public here receives.

Second, a number of alternative

means for obtaining information about jail conditions are
available to the press here, in addition to the public
tours.

-

Inmates can send and receive an unlimited number

of letters, to and from reporters as well as anyone else.
Anyone, including reporters, can visit friends who are
inmates during regular visiting hours.

Pre-trial

detainees can be interviewed by the press with the consent
of the detainee, his attorney, and the judge who has
jurisdiction over hius case.

Sentenced inmates can be

interviewed upon their release.

In Saxbe, the Court took

note of similar alternative channels of communication that
were open between inmates and the press. 417 U.S., at
847-848 (noting availability of communication by mail and
possibility of interviewing recently released inmates).
Such alternative means are no less relevant in considering

-

the rights of the press here.
Respondents reply that the Court has been less
than impressed by the availability of less effective

-

-

-

8.

alternative means of communication in First Amendment
cases since Pell and Saxbe. Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
757-758 n.15 (1976).

And these alternatives plainly are

less effective than timely, on-the-spot reporting.

See

Br. for Resps. at 57-61.
Discussion.

I think the chickens have come home

to roost for the majority in Pell and Saxbe. As you warned
there,

-

"From all that appears in the Court's opinion,
one would think that any governmental restriction
on access to information, no matter who severe,
would be constitutionally acceptable to the
majority so long as it does not single out the
media for special disabilities not applicable to
the public at large."
417 U.S., at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).

Respondents

have a good argument that they are much less able to
report effectively on conditions and events at the Santa
Rita jail than were the media parties in Pell and Saxbe.
Their argument for greater access than is accorded the
public is correspondingly stronger.

But as I read Justice

Stewart's opinions in Pell and Saxbe, the majority would
not recognize this difference.

Indeed, under the

majority's rationale, the result would be the same if the
Sheriff had continued to bar the public and the press from
the jail altogether, instead of instituting his tour

-

program.
If I were a member of the majority in Pell and

-

-

-

9.

Saxbe (Stewart, Burger, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist), I
would seize this opportunity to disavow the notion that
the press never can have a right to greater access to
information or events than is granted the public.

As you

showed in Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 857-860, this doctrine

r

sprang full-blown in Pell from comments that were
unnecessary to decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684-685 (1972).

Sound doctrine would hold that where, as

in the case of prisons, there are good reasons not to
admit all interested members of the general public to a
place, but where there is a need for public information

-

about that place, that is precisely the situation where
~

the press should be given a right of access that is
general public's.
'uwa,,,_,:.ws:...,

_,

In this way, the

press can serve as a conduit to the public for information
that the public itself, for legitimate reasons, is
prevented from gathering.

But I preach to the converted.

I also would have nothing to do with the notion
that a restraint on the use of a particular means either
of gathering or of transmitting information can be
justified because other, less effective means are
available.

The logic of that notion pushes one toward the

position that any restriction on a particular means is
permissible, as long as some other marginally effective

-

means is available.

But, as Justice Stewart once wrote in

response to such an argument, "The idea of imposing upon

~

-

-

-

10.

any medium of communication the burden of justifying its
presence is contrary to where I had always thought the
presumption must lie in the area of First Amendment
freedoms." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 615
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Alternative means usually
are invoked to make more palatable a decision that already
has been reached, i.e., that use of the particular means
for which protection is claimed may constitutionally be
prohibited. But one should not confuse the considerations
that properly go into deciding whether a particular means
can be banned, and the rhetoric by which that decision is
sugar-coated.

-

I do not know whether it would be possible to get
a Court to distinguish Pell and Saxbe on the ground that
members of the press did have substantial access to the
prisons there, even without the face-to-face interviews
that they sought.

Your notes from the discussion of Saxbe

at Conference seem to suggest that this factor might have
influenced the votes of Justices Stewart and White,

1:J:t

although Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court certainly
sounds absolutist to me.

On the other hand, Justice

Marshall, who joined your dissent in Saxbe, is out of this
case (presumably because the NAACP is a party).

I would

not hazard a prediction as to Justice Stevens' position,
although he did once write in dicta, Morales v. Schmidt,

-

489 F.2d 1335, 1346 n.8

(CA7 1973) (Stevens, J. dissenting):

-

-

-

11.

"Before a democratic society can effectuate
drastic institutional changes, the community at
large must be informed about the need for
change. That there is inadequate public
awareness of the nature of our penal system, and
that the system as a whole needs to be changed
dramatically, are propositions which correctional
officials are not likely to challenge .... If the
reasons for our faith in the principles embodied
in the First Amendment are valid, it is not
unreasonable to infer that there is a causal
connection between those two propositions."
B. There is less showing of justification for the
limitation here than in Pell or Saxbe. In Pell, Justice
Stewart also set forth the reasons for the State's
proscription of newsmen's face-to-face interviews with
selected inmates:
"[T]he policy [of permitting face-to-face
interviews] had resulted in press attention being
concentrated on a relatively small number of
inmates who, as a result, became virtual 'public
figures' within the prison society and gained a
disproportionate degree of notoriety and
influence among their fellow inmates. Because of
this notoriety and influence, these inmates often
became the source of severe disciplinary
problems."

-

417 U.S., at 831-832; accord, Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 848-849.

~

~

~

Here, on the other hand, respondents do not seek the right
to conduct face-to-face interviews with preselected

-

inmates; and the random interviews that they do seek to
conduct are, as the DC found, unlike to produce jail

LA-,~

"celebrities." Pet.App. at 32.

The Sheriff professes fear

that allowing newsmen to take photos will compromise jail
security because they might take photos of locks.

-

But

wardens of other prisons where newsmen are allowed access
testified that the media never had refused to comply with

-

-

-
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rules against photographing locks, nor cause any other
problems.

The Sheriff argues that allowing press access

would
"interfere with the facility's schedule,
involving the frequent movement of inmates to and
from classes, court, work and meals; would
require locking up all inmates upon the entrance
of visitors into the facility; would necessitate
enhanced security procedures to monitor the flow
of visitors and their belongings into the jail;
would increase inmate tensions; and would imperil
the continued viability of security devices
presently extant in the jail."
Br. for Petr at 23.

But this simply is not so.

Many

civilians come and go every day at the jail without the
necessity of locking up all the inmates or delaying their
movements. The experience at San Quentin suggests that

-

there will not be many press requests for access, so that
the burden of searching additional visitors will not be
great.

Respondents do not seek guided tours for large

groups; all they want is occasional access to cover
particular stories.
Discussion: These are the kinds of concerns that
are quite difficult for a court to evaluate, as all
members of the Pell Court acknowledged. One might
reasonably think that if the state and federal prisons
involved in Pell and Saxbe did not find it unduly
burdensome or dangerous to allow the same access as is
sought here, the Sheriff's cries of impend ing doom should
not carry much weight.

-

Moreover, it appears that some

other county jails in the San Francisco area find it
possible to allow access to the press of the kind sought

-

-

here.

13.

See App. 9-10 (list of stories KQED has done from

jails); 13-14 (newsman's account of producing live TV
program from San Francisco county jail); 14-15 (San
Francisco County Sheriff's account of same program); Br.
for Petrs at 10-12.
On the other hand, the county jail here may
operate on a tighter budget than the institutions in Pell
and Saxbe.

I imagine that some additional employee-time

would be required at the jail when the press comes to
call, because a jail employee would have to accompany
newsmen whereever they went.

And it might be true that

all movements of inmates would have to cease whenever a

-

newsman visited

although I doubt it.

My own view is that, judging by other prisons'
experiences, the Sheriff probably could protect his own
legitimate concerns by some means less restrictive than a
flat ban on press access.

~

~
"1/

~v

The DC's opinion stated that,

"The specific methods of implementing such a

access]

press

policy must be determined by" the Sheriff, subject

to the requirement that some photography and interviews be
allowed.

This, it could be argued, gives the Sheriff a

good deal of leeway to develop procedures that will allay
his fears.

Once again, however, I doubt whether the Pell

majority's rationale will allow it to recognize an
apparent lack of justification for a complete ban on press

-

access, if the public is not given the same access sought
by the press.

-

-

-
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C. Judge Hufstedler's argument. Judge Hufstedler,
writing in CA9, argued that Pell and Saxbe did not decide
the question whether the press could be confined to the
same limitations on access as are applied to the general
public.

This is so because in both cases the press in

fact had greater access than the public.

Moreover, Pell's

statement that the press has no greater right of access
than the public does not tell "what the public's right is
or how the right is to be vindicated."

Pet.App. at 23.

Thus, the questions presented by this case became:

-

(1) What kind of information about prisons and
prisoners does the public have a right to know?
Or, to put the question differently, from what
kind of information about prisons and prisoners
should the public be excluded? (2) What kinds of
limitations can be imposed on the public and on
the news media upon the means by which the
information to which the public is entitled can
be gathered?
The answer to the first question is that the public is
entitled to information about prisons and prisoners
"except to the extent [that limitations are] reasonably
necessary to shield the prisoners' small store of personal
privacy, to protect the physical security of the prison,
the prisoners, and prison personnel, and to allow prison
personnel enough privacy and administrative control to
permit them effectively to perform their duties." Id. at
24. The answer to the second question is that, although
the press and the public are entitled to the same

-

information about prisons, they are not necessarily
required to use the same means to obtain that

~,4;,.,,

::2

~.

~

-

-

information.

15.

Both a group tour by members of the general

public and a single newsman's visit are ways for the
public to obtain the information to which it is entitled.
But, while there may be good reasons to limit the scope of
the group tour, those reasons do not necessarily apply to
the single newman's visit.
In this case, the access granted to the press is
designed simply to facilitate obtaining of the information
to which the press and the public are equally entitled.
Therefore, although the access granted to the press here
is not "equal" to that granted to the public in a physical
sense, neither is it inconsistent with the teaching of

-

Pell and Saxbe.
Discussion.

Judge Hufstedler's argument is

useful because it points up the fact that there may be two
separate questions involved in this, and in many, press
access cases:

first, the question of physical access to a

place; and second, the question of access to particular
information.

If all or most of the general public is

excluded from a place simply because all interested
members of the general public could not be accomodated,
then there is a good argument that the press should be
allowed special access.

For example, the Courtroom cannot

accomodate all interested members of the general public

-

when a case like Bakke is argued. But, because all
interested members of the general public in some sense are
entitled to know what transpires in the Courtroom, the

-

-

-
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Court sets aside seats for members of the press so they
can report to the public.

The public is not entitled to

know what transpires at Conference, however, so neither
the press nor the general public is admitted to that.
It could be argued that in general a prison is
like a courtroom that cannot hold everyone who wants to
get in, and not like a Conference where no one has a right
to get in.

Pell and Saxbe could be explained as special

cases where interviews with particular inmates ~ere like
Conference: no one has a right to that information.

But,

as Judge Hufstedler seems to argue, this case could be
treated as one where the proceedings are public, but where

-

there just are not enough seats for all interested members
of the general public, so that the press should have a
special right to some of the seats.
This approach leaves the knotty problem of
deciding what information the public is entitled to.

I do

not think this should cause problems in most prison cases,
because most of what transpires in prisons must become
public record in one way or another anyway.

Santa Rita

jail, for example, probably was required by law to
announce that a suicide had occurred there, and it likely
had to report to the federal court on efforts to upgrade
conditions.

Thus, the information that respondents here

sought to report already was "public" in some significant

-

sense.
(1975).

Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
For this reason, this case might not require the

-

-

17.

Court to decide whether the First Amendment functions
anything like a Freedom of Information Act.
D. If the majority votes to reverse. If none of
these ways of distinguishing Pell and Saxbe convinces a
majority, I would strongly urge that you adhere to your
position in those cases.

I think it is correct, and I

think it is important for you to continue to a r ticulate it
for the benefit of future Justices and, with luck, future
majorities.

One day they may need persuasive authority

for adopting your position.
J.A.

-
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Thomas L. Houchins, Sheriff of
On Writ of Certiorari to the
'(_
the County of Alameda,
United States Court of
California, Petitioner,
Appeals for the Ninth
/ '
v.
Circuit.
KQED, Inc., et al.
~

j

[March -, 1978]

•

~
•

~
~

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a preliminary injunction ~~
requiring the Sheriff of Alameda County, Cal., to allow
representatives of the news media access to the county jail is ~ ""'f
consistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, ~
,:;f- •
834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to
~
~
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general G ,,.i __J~
public."
Respondent KQED, Inc., operates a public service television
station .in Oakland, Cal. It has televised a number of pro- ~ • -Igrams about prison conditions and prison inmates. KQED
~
reporters have been granted access to various correctional
-/fa,ei}ities in the San Francisco Bay ,area, including San Quentin
State Prison, Soledad Prison anq the San Francisco County ~
J ~"' .• A I j ~ . ~ .6
Jails at San Bruno and San Francisco, to prepare program
material They have taken their ca.mer~ and recording equip-/ J , - ~ ~
ment inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed
~
inmates. No disturbances or other problems have occurred on IJlA..
I tJ •
those occasions.
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the (J.. • 4 I
Alamed& County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast / ~ /
111
reporting a decision of the United States District Court finding lA/')A-,,'1----1<-

J
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that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed
[at Santa Rita] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for
man or bei:ist as a matter of law." 1 Petitioner is the Sheriff
of Alameda County and has general supervision and control of
the Santa Rita facility. 2
On March 31 , 1975, KQED reported the suicide of a prisoner
in the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita jail. That program
also carried a statement by a psychiatrist assigned to Santa
Rita to the effect that conditions in the Greystone facility were
responsible for illnesses of inmates. 3 Petitioner's disagreement with that conclusion was reported on the same newscast.
KQED reqµested permission to visit and photograph the
.area of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused,
advising KQED that it was his polic not to ermit an acce s
to the jail b the news media. · is policy was also invoked
4
by petitioner to deny su2tsequent requests for access to thejail
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged
·inciqents within the facility. 4 Except for a carefully super- ,
vised tour in 1972, the news media were completely excluded
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this
action was commenced."
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972) .
Based on a personal visit to the facilit.y, .Judge Zirpoli rea,ched the
"inescapable conclusion that Greystone should be razed to the ground."
2 Petitioner has been employed by the Sheriff's Department for 30
years, including five as commanding officer of the jail at Santa. Rita. He
was elected to his present office in 1974.
3 The psychiatrist was discharged after the t,e]ecast.
4 Access was denied, for example, to cover stories of alleged gang rapes
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes
from the jail, Tr. 135-136.
5 A previous sheriff had conducted one "press tour" in 1972, attended
by reporters and cameramen. But the facilit.y had been "freshly scrubbed"
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden, to ask any questions of the
i.n:mRtefi. the)! encol)ptei:ed. (AI?I?· 16:--17.) .,

-
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People,° filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17,
1975. 1 The complaint alleged that petitioner had provided no
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions
prev~iling in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances may
reach the public." It further alleged that petitioner's policy
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the ja.il facility
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constit,u tion an'd requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and
Santa Rita facilities and generally preventing full and accurate
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6-7.
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a prelimfa13,ry injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of
the news m~ia, the Sheriff of San Francisco County, and the
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in
other penal institutions and uniformly expressed the opinion
that such coverage had no harmful consequences and in fact
served a significant public purpose.7
-0 The NAACP alleged a "special concern with conditions at Santa Rita
because tlre prisoner population at the jail is disproportionately black, and
the members of the NAACP depend on the news media for information
about conditions in the jitil so that they can meaningfully participate in
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Complaint Paragraph 3.
Since no special relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the
part,ies have focused on the claim of KQED.
7 The sheriff has a. master's degree in criminology from the University
of California at Berkeley and 10 year~ experience in law enforcement
with the San Francisco Police Department,. As sheriff he has general
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He
expressed the "opinion, based on, m~' education and experience in law
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an important cpntribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. In
my opinion jails are public institutions nnd the public has a right to know
what i's being done with their tax dollars being spent on jail facilities an,d
:pro~rams." Al_)_p. 15.

-
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The affidavit of the attorney for KQED described a series of
telephone conversations with counsel for the County between
May 12, 1975 and June 17, when this suit was filed. In the
'first conversation, respondents' counsel explained KQED's
problem regarding access to the S11,nta Rita facility. In the
second, County Counsel stated that a rule or regulation regarding press access would be forthcoming within a week. In the
third conversation, more than two weeks later, County Counsel
stated tha.t no access rule had yet been developed, and agreed
'to forward ·a copy of the prison rules which were then in effect
for maximuJU security inmates. 8 In the last communication,
on June 10, 1975, County Counsel stated that petitioner was
contempl11,ting monthly public tours for 25 persons, with the
first tour tentatively scheduled for July 14. The tours, however, would not include the cell portions of Greystone and
would not allow any use of cameras or communication with
inmates. Respondents filed suit on June 17, 1975.
In a letter to the County Board of Supervisors dated June 19,
1975, petitioner outlined a pilot public tour program along the
lines of that described to respondents' counsel. The Board
approved six tours. Petitioner then filed his answer and supporting affidavit explaining why he had refused KQED access
to the jail and identifying the recent changes in policy regarding access to the jail and communication between inmates and
persons on the outside. Petitioner stated that if KQED's
request had been granted, he would have felt obligated to
honor similar requests from other representatives of the press
and this could have disrupted mealtimes, exercise times, visiting times, and court appearances of inmates. 9 He pointed out
The inmates at Santa Rita include ~ det.a~ detainees as well as prisoners
who have been convicted and :,;entenee .
he mles in effect on June 3,
1975, contained no rule on pre::;;, acee:,;~ . Vi:,;iting was limited to three
hours on Sunday. All outgoing mail , except letters to judges or lawyers,
was inspected. The mle prohibited any mention of "the names or a.ctions
··of any officers" of the jail.
o In conttast to the floodgate concerns expressed by petitioners, the
8

~~

-
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that the mail regulations had recently been amended to delete
a prohibitioii again~t mentioning the names or actions of any
correctional officers. Petitioner also stated that KQED had
been advised about the contemplated program of guided tours
before the suit was filed and that the tours had since been
approved and publicly announced. With respect to the scope
of the proposed tours, petitioner explained that the use of
cameras would be prohibited because it would not be possible
to prevent 25 persons with cameras from photographing
inmjl,teS and security operations. Moreover, communication
with inmates would not be permitted because of excessive time
consumption, "problems with control" of inmates and visitors,
and a belief "that interviews would be excessively unwieldy." 10
An e_yidentiary hearing on _!_he motion for a preliminary
in.j unction wa~
d after the'1irst ! our gmded tours had taken
place. Th e evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a
means of obtaining information about the inmates and their
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The
tours failed to enter certain areas of the ·ail. 11 They afforded
no opportunity to photograph con 1tions within the facility,
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks
above the cells from which guards can observe the inmates. 12
The tours provided no opportunity to g_uestion randomly
encountered inmates abouCjail conditions. Indeed, to the
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of
,access rules at that, institution media requests to enter the facility actually
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest that the mere existence
of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the
closed institution require especially close scrutiny.
10 App., at 24.
11 The tour did not, include Little Greystone, which was the subject of
reports of beatings, rapes and poor conditions, or the disciplinary cells.
12 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell,"
of the "disciplinary cells," or of the interior of Little Greystone. In addition, the photograph of the dayroom omits the television monitor that
maintains continuous observation of the inmates and the open urinals.

-
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extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour,
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic pictme
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition,
the fixed scheduliitg of the tours prevented coverage of newsworthy events at the jail.
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were completely bo_Qked and there was no assurance "that any tour would
be -conducted after75ecember of 1975. The 'tSistrict Court
found that KQED had no access to the· jail and that the broad
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological
in terests.13
13 "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa. Rita has never e.xperimented with a more liberal pres;; policy than that presently · in exist.en.ce,
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no
recollection of hearing of any disruption caused · by the media at other
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he feared
that, invasion of inmates' privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats
of jail security would result from a more liberal press policy. While such
fears are not groundless, convincing te8timony was offered that such fears
can be substantially allayed.
"As to the inmates' privacy, the media represtmta.tives commonly obtain
written consent from t.hose inmates who are interviewed and/or photo. graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full
agreement,. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial
publicity, consent can be obtained not only from such inmates but also
from their counsel. Jail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result
of a random interview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and
equipment brought into the jail can be searched. While Sheriff Houchins
expressed concern that photographs of electronic locking devices could be
enlarged and studied in order to facilita.te escape plans, he admitted that
the inmates themselves can study and · sketch the locking devices. Most
importantly, there was substantial testimony to the effect that ground
rules laid down by jail admini;;tra.to1'8, such as a ban on photographs of
security devices, are consistently respected by the media.
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence c.onceni.ing the present media, policy
at Santa Rita, the Cqurt finds the plaintiffs have demonstrated irr<'parable
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of succesi, op.
the merits, a favorable public inten>;;t , and a balance of hardships which
must he striick in plaintiffs' favor." App., at 69.

I;-~~
~
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The District Court thereafter i~ ued a preliminaix injunction, enjoining petitioner "from denyii1g to KQED news
~nnel and responsible representatives of the news media
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at
reasonable times and hours," or from preventing such representatives "from utilizing photographic and sound equipment
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court,
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event,
should retain the right to deny access when jail tensions or
other special circumstances require exclusion.
Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 14 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under
review. 15 MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice,
stayed the mandate and in his opinion on the stay application
fairly stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari
to decide:
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access'
doctrine of PeU and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court
of Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly
limited to the situation where there already existed substantial press and public access to the prison, then Pell
and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review by
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of
'14 Two circuit judges -granted a sta.y of the District Court's order pend~
ing disposition of petitioner's appeal.
15 546 F. 2d 284 (1976).
A petition for rehearing, a suggestion for
rehearing en bane, and a motion to stay the mandate were all denied by
the Ninth CircQit, •

!
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those cases, would be appropriate, although not necessary." 429 U.S. 1341, 1344.
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the
decisions in P~ U and Sa..-rbe,.do not contraj the propriety of the
District Court's preliminary injunction. :Wt , the unconstitutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a
greater right of access to information regarding prison conditions than do other members of the public. Second, relief
tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded to
a representative of the press which is successful in proving that
it has been harmed by a constitutional violation and need not
await the grant of relief to members of the general public who
may also have been injured by petitioner's unconstitutional
·access policy but h1we not yet sought to vindicate their rights,

I
This litigation grew out of petitioner's refusal to allow
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the
Santa Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institution of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by petitioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, therefore we must consider the relevance of the actions after
March 31, 1975, to the question whether a constitutional violation had occurred.
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in
anticipation of litigation or following commencement of suit
does not deprive the court of power to decide whether the
previous course of conduct was unlawful. See UniJted States
16
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633.

I

16 Moreover, along with the power to decide the merits, the Court's
pown to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuruice of illegal conduct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injuno.
tiye reli~f b~ l?rot.estations of repentance an.cl reform, especially wh~l\
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The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case
is apparent. When this ~ t was,_filed, there were no publi_c
tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion
art'o th the public and the press from those areas within the
Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate correspondence addressed to persons other than la'Yyers and judges
and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the
guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as
well as prison w&,].ls significantly abridged the opportunities for
communication of information about the conditions of confinement in the Santa Rit~ facility to the public.u Therefore,
abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit-, and there is a, probability of
resumption." United States v. Oregon Medical, Society, 343 U. S. 326,
333. When the District Court, issued the preliminary injunction, there was
no assurance that the experiment.al public tours would continue beyond
the next month. Thus, it would certainly have been reasonable for the
court to assume that, absent injun,ctive relief, the access to the inner portions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitigation

level.
'17 Thus, when this suit was filed, there exis:too no opportunity for outsiders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at Santa Rita. And
the mail regulations prohibited statemPnts about the character of the
treatment of prisoners by correctional officers.
We cannot agree with petitioner that the i,i1ma.tes' visitation and telephone privileges were reasonable lllternativc means of informing the public at large about conditions within Santa Rita. Neither offered an opportunity to observe those conditions. Even if a member of the general public or a representative of the press were fortunate enough to obtain the
name of an inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included
the inmate's place of confinement. The jajl regulations do not indicate
that an inmate in the minimum security portion of the jail may enlist
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of th6
general public to complain of the conditions of confinement. App. 38 .
Even if a maximum security inmate may make collect telephone calls, it
is unlikely that a member of the general public or representa.t ive of the
press would accept the charges, especiaJly without prior knowledge of the
·call's communicative purpose.
.Alt.!hough sentenced prisoners may not be interviewed under any cir,

-
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even if there would not have been any constitutional violation
had the access policies adopted by petitioner following commencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access
were constitutional.
In Pell v. Procunie:r, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court stated
that "newsmen have•no constitutional right of access to prisons
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from
access to information about prison conditions would avoid
constitutional scrutiny. 1 8 Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests
the contrary.
cumstances, pretrial detainees may, according to petitioner, be interviewed
with the consents of the inmates, defense comi,.sel and prosecutor and with
an order from the court. Not only would such an interview take place
outside the confines of the jail, but the requirement of a court order makes
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the
ja.il and its inmatffi.
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with
information regarding the release of prisoners which, according to petitioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the conditions of their recent confinement. This informll,l offer Wll-8 apparently only
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford
the public any opportunity to observe the conditions of confinement.
Hence, the means available at the time this · suit was instituted for
informing the general public a.bout conditions in the Santa Rita jail were,
as a practical matter, nonexistent.
18 In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17, the Court said:
"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information." (Emphasis added.)
And in Bran;burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681:
"We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection ; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
Both fitatements imply that there is a right to acquire knowledge tha,t

-
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In that case, representatives of the press claimed the right to
interview specifically designated inmates. In evaluating this
claim, the Coqrt di'd not simply inquire whether prison officials
allowed me.qibers of the general public to coµduct such interviews. Rather, it canvassed the opportunities already a.vailable for both the public and the press to acquire information
r~garding the prison a.nd its inmates. And the Court found
that the policy of prohibiting interviews with inmates specifically designated by the press was "not pjtrt of a.n attempt by
the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons." The challenged restriction on access, which was imposed only after
experience revealed that such interviews posed disciplinary
problems, was an isolated limitation on the efforts of the press
to gather information a.bout thpse conditions. It was against
the background of & record which demonstrated that both the
press and the general public )Vere "accorded full opportunities
to observe prison conditions," 19 that the Court considered the
constitutionality ·of the single restr11,int on access challenged
in Pell.
The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state
policy of conce11,ling prison coµditions from the press, or a
policy denying the press any opportunity to observe those
conditions, colJ,ld have been justified simply by pointing to like
derives protection from the First Amendment. See Branzburg, supra, at
STEWART, J ., dissenting.
111 "The Department of Corrections regularly conducts public tours
through the prisons for the bene6t of interestaj citizens. In addition,
newsmen are permitted to visit both the ma.ximqm security and minimum
security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any subject to any inmates whom they might encounter. If security considerations permit, corrections personnel will step aside to permit such interviews
to be confidential. Apart from general access to all parts of the institutions, newsmef\ are also pel'IQit~d to enter the pri.sons to interview inmates
selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if a
newsman wishes to write a story on a partjculttr prison program, he is
permitted to sit in on group meetings and to interview the inmate pa.r..
ticipants.1' 417 U. S., at 830.
728 n. 4,
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concealment from , and denial to, the general public. If that
were not true, there would have been no need to emphasize
the substantial press and public access reflected in the record _
of that case.20 What Pell does indicate is that the question
whether respondents established a probability of prevailing on
their constitutional claim is inseparable from the question
whether petitioner's policies unduly restricted the opportunities of the general public to learn about the conditions of
confinement in Santa Rita jail. As in Pell, in assessing its ~
adequacy, the total access of the public and the press must
be considered.
Here, the broad restraints on access to information regarding
opm'""tion of the jail that prevailed on the date this suit was
~
instituted are plainly disclose<l by the record. The public and
the press had consistently been denied any access to those
~~
,,,--(
'

~

-.........

-

Nor would it have been necessary to note, as the Pell opinion did, the
fact that the First Amendment protects the free flow of information to
the public:
"The constitutional guarantee of a. free press 'assures the maintenance
of our political system and an open society,' Time , Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S.
374, 389 (1967) , and secures 'the parawount. public interest in a free flow
of information to the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254 (1964). By the same token, '[a.] ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bea.ring a heavy presumption
against. its constitutional validity.' New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 40?
U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Correlatively,
the First and J<'ourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public
to receive such 'information and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U. S., at 762-763; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564
(1969).
" In Bra:nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court went further
and acknowledged that 'news gathering is not without its First Amend·ment protections,' id., at 707, for 'without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,' id., at .681." 417
20

U.S., at 832--8:33.
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portions of the Santa Rita facility where inmates were confined
and there had been excessive censorship of inmate correspondence. Petitioner's no-access policy, modified only in the
wake of respondents' resort to the courts, could survive constitutional scrutiny only if the Con~titution affords no protection
to the public's right to be informed about conditions within
those public institutions where some of its members are confi~ed becatJ.se they have bee}) charged with or found guilty of
criminal offenses.

II
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective
of the First Amendment to the Constitution.21 It is for this
reason that the First Amendment protects not only the dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas. See,
e. g., Virginia PharllJP,CY Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756rProcunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408409; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763. 22 Thus,
in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison
regulations authorizing excessive c~nsorship of outgoing inmate
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.
2d 1335, 1346, n. 8 (CA7 1973) . So here, petitioner's prelitigation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement

~

~

~

I

21 See, e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 764-765; Garrison v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 64, 77; New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266---270; Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250.
See also Branzburg v. HayeB, 408 U. S. 665, 726 n. 2 (S'I'EWAR'l', J.,

dissenting.)
,z-i See also Larrumt v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301; Red Lion
Broadcastinn Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 300; Stanley v. Georgia, 304 U.S.
557, 564; Martin v. City of Struthers, 31~ U.S. 141 ; Marsh v. Alabama..,
~2& 11. $. i\Ol,
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on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the
intended communication.
~ ~dition to safeguarding the right of one inclividual to
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amendment serves an essential societal function. 23 Our system of
self-government assumes the existence of an informed citizenry.24 As Madison wrote:
"A popular Government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or
a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And 11, people who mea,n to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge
gives." Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hurst ed.
1910).
I~ not sufficientJ therefore, that the channels of communicatioI_! J2e free of governmental restraint~ Without some pro23 "What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No
aspect of that const.itutionaJ guarantee is more treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider
anq resolve their o-.yn destiny. . . . It embodies our Nation's commit..
ment to popular se!f-determiMtion and our abiding faith that the surest
course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views
as public issues. 1\.nd public debate must not only be unfettered; it must
also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated tha.t
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas
as well as the right of free expression·." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (PowELL, J., dissentmi}.
24 See A. Meiklejohn, F'ree Speech and its Relation to Self-Government
26 (1948):
"Just as far as . . . the citizen;, who are to decide an issue are denied
. acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criti' cism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be illconsidered, ill~baJanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutila•
tion of the thinking process of the commimity agall1$t which the First
Amendment to the Constitution is directea.
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tection for the acquisition of information about the o eration
of pu ic insti u ions such as prisons y t e pu 1c at arge, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the F ramers would
be stripped of its substance. 2 5
For that reason information-g.!!_thering is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protea1on. S'ee, e. g., Branz"burg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 681; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 833;
"a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist." 26
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protection is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and
importance.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, representatives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising
revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the
members of an organized society, united for their common
good, to impart and acquire information about their common
interests." Id., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle

(

1~ ·
.J

25 Admitt.edly, the right to receive or a.cquire information is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. But. "the protection of the Bill of
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from ... abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing adherents are ,not free to receive
and con:;ider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S., at
380 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It would be an even more barren market7
place that had willing buyers and seller:; and no meaningful information
to exchange.
___,
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J ., dissenting):
"No les8 important to the news dis:;emination process is the gathering of
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of
so)lle dimensions, must, exist.''
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.in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisementsthe so-called "taxes on knowledge":
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and
controlling aim was to prevent. or curtail the opportunity
for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect
of their governmental -affairs. . . . The aim of the struggle {against those ta.xes] was ... to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.
Upon the correctness of this conclusion, the very characterizations of the exactions as 'taxes on knowledge' sheds
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an informed and enlightened public opinion was the thing at
stake." Id., at 247.
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle,
the Court held:
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.
The tax involved here is bad ... because. in light of its
history and its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate
a,nd c;tlculated device ... to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties." Id., at 250.
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of
public generally" 27 is also implicit in the doctrine that "newsmen have no""constitutional right of access to prisons or their
·inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In P~ll i1 was unnecessary to ---...
consider the extent of the public's right of access to .m.formation regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate

-

27

Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U. S., at 864.
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record
dernonstr11ted that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and th-rough the press, was adequate to survive constitutional challenge; institutional considerations justified denying the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in
that case:
- Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is'-whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of information at its source, abridged the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The ariswer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions
1 of policy which generally must be resolved by the political
branches of government. Moreover, there are unquestionably
---occasiohs when governmental activity may properly be carried
on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and the press
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our ow
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies ga ring in executive sessioq ._ ." Branzburg v: Ha s, 408
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In such
situations the reasons for withholding i)1formation rom the
public are both apparent and legitimate. 28
28 In the case of grand jury proceeding:;, for example, the secrecy rule
has been justified on several grounds:
"(l) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contempla.ted; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or·
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later
appear at the trial of those indicted by it; ( 4) to encourage free and·
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to
tlie CQll\ltllilSion of crime$; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exoner-·
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In this case, however, "[r]espondents do not assert a right
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in
any way the decisionmlll{ing processes of governmental officials."." They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of
concealing prison conditions from the public. J'hose conditions are wholly without claim to confideqtiality. While prison
· officials have aninterest in the time and manner of public
. acquisition of information about the institutions they administer, no one eve~ suggests that there is any legitimate,
penological justification for concealing from citizens the conditi9ns in which their fellow citizens are being confined. 30
The reasons which militate • favor of providing special
protection to the flow of information to the pµblic about
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a democratic society. Not only are they public institutions, financed
with public funds and administered by public servants; 31
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system.
The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and sometimes
permanently, deprived of their liberty as a result of a trial
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By
ated from disclosure of the fact that. he has been under investigation, and
from t.he expense of standing trial where there •Was no probability of
guilt.." United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U. S.-677, 681 n. 6.
29 &u:be v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S., at 861
(POWELL, J.,
dissenting).
•
30 The Court. in Saxbe noted that " 'prisons are institutions where public access is generally limited.'" 417 U. S., at 849 (citation omitted).
This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological inter' ests served by regulating access, e. g., security and confinement. But concealing prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate
objectives.
31 "The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of con,finement. that. they maintain,
and t.he experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters
of legitima.t e societal interest and concern.'' Baxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
-,41i _U. S. 1 at 861 (POWELL, J ., dissenting).
,
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expr~s command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding
mqst be a '!public trial." 32 It is important not only that the
tritil itself be fair, but also that the community at large have
co11Qdence in ~he integrity of the proceeqing. 33 That public
interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is
treawd during his period of punishwent and hoped-for rehabilitation. While a .ward of the State and subject to its sterp
d~sciplii1e, he retains constitutional protections against cruel
~d'qnusual punish'w ent, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97; a protect~on which may derive more :practical support from
l:\,Ccess to information
about prisons by the public than by
'.
occasionaJ litigation in a, busy court. 34
.
, Some inµiates-in 811,nta Rita, a ~ubstt\ntip.l nUTPher-are
pretrial q~t~ ees. Though confined pending tri11l, they have
not bee~1 convicted of an offense against society and are
e'ntitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain peno1ogical
objectives, i. e., punishment, deterrence and rehabilitat.ion,
which are legiti~ate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inap'

vy

32 In all criminal prosecutions, the acctised shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and pµb~c trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dist rict
wherein the orµne shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascerta~ned by la.w, a11d to be informed of thfl nature a,nd
cause of the accus11,tions; ..." U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
,
83 "The right to a public trial is not only to protect tbe accused but, to .
protect as much the public's right to kn,ow what goes on when men's lives
and liberty are at stake ...." Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F. 2d 791, 792 (CA4
1965). See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270: "The knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."
114 In fact, conditions within the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita.
facility had been found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972) . The
public's interest in eni,uring that these conditions ha.ve been remedied jg
app{U'ent. For, in fina.l analysis, it is the citizens who bear re6ponsibi1itytoi: tlJ~ ~t:IJ.lent'l!!CCQJ'q,~ t.l1Q$e confin~ within penal institutions,
I
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plicable to pretrial detainees."5 Society has a special interest
in ensuring that unconvicted citizens are treated in accord with
(J
"tpeir status. .
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public
·and the press had been consistently c;lfyl~d any access to the
inner portions of the Santa Rita jair,-that ~re had been
·excessive censorship of inma.te correspondence~d that there
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow
·of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether
respondent established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
did n~t depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to
special treatment beyond that accorded the. public at large.
Ratqer, the probable existence of a constitutional violation
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic
community access to knowledge about how its servants were
treitting some of its members who have been committed to
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting ofI the flow of
information a,t its source abridges the freedom of speech and
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution .36
35 "Incarceration after conviction is imposed to ptmish, to deter, and to
- rehabilitate the convict. . . . Some freedom to accomplish these ends must
of necessity be afforded prison personnel. Conversely, where incarceration
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment, and retribution
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is
but a temporary holding operation, and their necessary freedom of action
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in such a context are
out of harmony with the presumption of in,nocence." Anderson v. Nosser,
438 F . 2d 18.1, 190 (CA51971) .
36 When fundamental freedoms of citizen.-; have been at stake, the Court
has recognized that an abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a
wide variety of governmental policies, See, e. g., American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; NAACP v. 4labama, 357 U.S. 449;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616 ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 291
U.S . 233.
.
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III
The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duti_es
-Of\ etitioner that ma not be required b the Con titution
I~
itsel . Tfie injunction was not an a use o discretion for
either of these reas~ .
-•
lf a l ~an prove that he has suffered specific harm
froJn the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is
entirely proper for a court to grant relief tailored to his needs
without attempting to redress all the misch~ef that the policy )
-<\
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different
iµetbods of remen;yiug._a yiolation oUhat right n.2.ay_§ometimes
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or
the ot~ · Prelimin~ry relief could theref~re appropriately be
awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it w11s
affected by the challenged policy without also gr~nting specific
relief to the general public. Indeed, since our adversary
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies
between specific litigants, it would have been improper for the
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who
have not requested separate relief. Accordingly, even though
the Cons itJJ..ti~ provides the press wit~ no greater right of )
access to informatfmy than that possesseq by the public at SJ
large, a pre 1mma.ry injunction is not iri'valid simply because it
awards special relief to a successful litigant which is a representative of the press:37
37 Moreover, the relief grall,ted to KQED will redound to the benefit of
members of the public j.nterested in obtaining information about conditions in the Santa ~ita jail. The press may have no greater constitutionaJ
righl,!o i!!formation ahout)prisons than that possessed by the general public. But when the press does acquire il\forma.tion and disseminate it to
the public, it performs An important societal function.
" In seeking o~t the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the pub•
Ic ~.t J.a~e.. l~ if:l_ O;ie w.ean~ b:y whi.cb, tl).e people receive that free flow of

-
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Nor is there 1:tnything novel about injunctive relief which
goes beyond a .rpere prohibition against repetition of previous
unlawfql conduct. In situations which are both numerous and
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirma/
tive steps ·to eJiminate the1,!;,ffec.!,s)>f 9:, violation of la~ _even _ /
though the law itself impo§g no duty to take the remedial
action decreed by the court. 38 It follow~ that if prison regulations and policies have unconstitution~lly suppressed information and ipterfered wit4 communication in violation of the
First Ameqdment, t~istrict Qourt hfl,S the power to require,
a.l,Jt:8.§~J;,e.IJ}JlP[ag,ly, that the channe's of communication be
opeped more widel)'hthan the law would otherwise require in
;;-rder to Jet relevant facts, which may have been conce~led,
corµe to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of
that preliminarily awarded in this Cf\80 would be "aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation," Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, it is perfectly
clear that the Court had power to enter an injunction which I
was broader than a mere prohibition against illegal conduct.
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the
specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor
would i,t be appropriate for us to review the scope of the

I

information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By erutbling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of t~e
First Amendment." Saxbe v. WashingtQn Post Co., 417 U. S., at 863-864
(POWELL, J., dissenting).
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J.,
dissenting).
In the context of fashioning a remedy for' a violation of rights protected: p
by the First Amendment, consideration of the roll" of the press in our
society is appropriate.
38 For an extensive discussion of this practice in the context of desegregation decrees, see. the Co1irt's opinion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley,
· 433 u. s. 267.
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order.8 9 The order was preliminary in character, and is subject
to revision in the light of experience and such evidence and
argument as may be presented before the litigation is finally
concluded.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

MR. dU?TICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.

We note, however, that the DiE=trict Court. was presented wit h substa ntial evidence indic,1ting that the ui,e of cameras and int erviPws with
randomly selected inmat.es neither jeopardized securit y nor threatened
legitj~te ~ olo~ical i~terff:ts in . other prisons where such access w~g,
:perm,1tted.. See Procumer "· Ma.r,t1nez, 416, U.S., at 414 n. 14.
38

-

-
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

•
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d' ,,

March 17, 1978

From: Jim Alt
Re: Justice Stevens' First Draft opinion for the Court in
No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED.
If Justice Stevens' opinion commands a majority, I think
that it will become a landmark precedent.

The opinion is

consistent with Pell and Saxbe, because it concedes that the
the press has "no greater right of access to information than
that possessed by the public at large."

1/
id., at 10.-

Draft at 21; accord,

But it breaks new ground in holding that both

the press and the public have a First Amendment right of access

-

to information that is in the government's hands, which can
be overridden only for good reasons:
"[T]he Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press
from access to information about prison conditions would
avoid constitutional scrutiny." Id., at 10.
"Petitioner's no-access policy . • . could survive
constitutional scrutiny only if the Constitution affords
no protection to the public's right to be informed about
conditions within those public institutions where some of
its members are confined • • • " Id., at 13.
"It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channel~ of
connnunication be free of governmental restraints. Without some
protection for the acquisition of information about the
operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the
Framers would be stripped of its substance." Id., at 14-15.
"The question is whether petitioner's policies,
which cut
off the flow of information at its source, abridged the public's
right to be informed • • • " Id., at 17.

-

"equal"
1. The Justice does state that the public's and press's/rights
might be implimentedcfffferently: "Though the public and the press
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different
methods of remedying a violation of that right may Sometimes be
needed to accomodate the special concerns of one or the other." Id., 21 ,

-

-

•

2.

I believe that Justice Stevens' opinion meets the concern~,
and tracks certain of the views, that you expressed in your
Saxbe dissent.

Although the Saxbe majority did not say in so

many words that neither the press nor the public had any right
of access to information in the government's hands, you feared
that that was the implication of the majority holding: "For all L (that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any

P

----

governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how
severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so
long as it does not single out the media for special disabilities
not applicable to the public at large." Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 857.
You stated that you "cannot follow the Court in concluding t h a t ~

-

governmental restriction on press access to information, so
long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First
Amendment concern." Ibid. And you expanded on the thought:
"It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify
under the stringent standards of First Amendment review every
regulation that might affect in some tangential way the
availability of information to the news media. But to my
mind it is equally impermissible to conclude that no
governmental inhibition of press access to newsworthy informa t ion
warrants constitutional scrutiny. At some point official
restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed
solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First
Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require
the government to justify such regulations in terms more
compelling than discretionary authority and administrative
convenience." Id., at 860.
You were willing to strike down the interview ban in Saxbe because

y

-

you could discern no legitimate governmental interest that it served.
See id., at 861.
My own view is that the principle announced in Justice Stevens'

y[

-

3.

2/
opinion is sound.-

It is true that the principle will give rise

to difficult questions as to what is a sufficient justification

------

for refusing to release information.

Justice Stevens hints

broadly that the Court is not abou.t t a apply a "compelling state
interest" test in this context; but he leaves unsaid what standard

----

it will apply:

~~
ifl")--t"1

"The answer to '[ the] question [in this case] does not
depend upon the degree of public disclosure which should
attend the operation of most governmental activity. Such
matters involve questions of policy which generally must be
resolved by the political branches of government• Moreover,
there are unquestionably occasions when governmental
1 secrecy may properly be carried on in complete secrecy. For
example, the public and the press are corrnnonly excluded from
'grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, [and] the
(
meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive
session . • • • • [Quoting Branzbur~ v. Hates] In such
situations the reasons for withhol ing in ormation from
the public are both apparent and legitimate." Draft at 17.

~

U~.k...)

r--

- ~

{'17

doubt whether these disclaimers will prevent a fair volume of

~

tigation testing the new principle from arising, but they should

l}f\'~

give courts a signal not to go hog-wild in granting access.

Although

a difficult set of questions will have to be resolved, it seems to

~·

~e that, as you and Justice Stevens have argued, the policy of

l

the First Amendment requires that the task be undertaken.

*

*

·k

*

*

A couple of other points about the opinion should be noted .
First, Justice Stevens has decided the case on the facts as they
existed at the time the complaint was filed (when there was virtually
no access to either the public or the press), rather than at the
time the DC decided the case (after the Sheriff instituted his so-callee
-

2. This principle may also be the only way to square the outcome
here with that in Pell and Saxbe. Cf. Bench Memo at 15-17.

•

e
-

"public tours").

See Draft at 8-10.

4.

Although this technique

is dabatable, it has the virtue of narrowing the decision here
to cover only a situation where the press and the public have
virtually no access at all.
Second, the Justice quite carefully avoids deciding whether
the degree of access ordered by the DC in its preliminary injunction
goes beyond what the First Amendment requires.

See Draft at 21-23.

Although this, too, is a debatable technique, it too narrows
somewhat the scope of the decision in this case.

*

·k

,'(

*

*

I expect that Justice Stevens will draw heavy fire from
the dissenters.

•

Indeed, I would be a little surprised if he

can get a majority to join his

opinion, since other Members of

the Court may not be eager to announce what may come to be a
general "right of access to information" under the First Amendment.
Even if the Jus~tice does get a majority to join his opinion, the
Court will be in the awkward position of handing down an important
new precedent by a 4-3 vote.

I think that the last time this happened

was in Fuentes v. Shevin, and the aftermath of that decision has
not been altogether happy.

But since this case must be decided, I

see no way to avoid the situation.
JA

-

y

• .. •.

March

76-1310

Dear John:
and

Over the weekend, I read wlth
admiration your opinion for the Court.

My interest derives, in major part, from the fact
that I read your opinion as a substantial adoption of the
views I expressed in my Saxbe dissent. I admire your
opinion because, in addition to being extremely well
written, you come out with sound doctrine and yet
accomplish this consistently with Saxbe as well as Pell.
If your draft becomes the opinion of the Court, as
I hope, it will be a landmark precent. It wilL be the
first time that the Court has held that both the press and
the public share a First Amendment right of access ' to
information in the government•~ hands, subject to
appropriate safeguards.
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I do have a coupJe of suggestions that I think are
quite important. We know that pressures from various
sources, in addition to the- press, have .been building in
recent years for total disclosure of al ~ information in the
hands of government, · however conf identfa'l or .secret . it may
be when judged in terms of enabling government tq
function. For example, there are law professors who join
the media in saying th~t -conferences of our Court should be
open to the public. The Freedom of Informatjon Act also
has caused serious problems. Ed Levi told me that it now
requires the full time attention of over 100 people in the '
Justice Department simply to process demands. This sort of
"openness" has the merit you identify. It also has
negatives. It causes people in government to be ever
~
fearful that their views and recommendations will end up in
the public press or in some congressional expose. Thus,
forthright candor - that often exists only if one is
assured of confidentiality - is likely to become a

-

';t ·•,· ' " '

.-·1~

I

-2-

disappearing characteristic of government officials and
employees.

·~ 1•

· In Nixon I (418 U.S . 683, at 705), the Court
declined to sustain an absolute privilege by the President,
but ~ecognized the need for a qualified privilege:

, ,,.
"

_.,.

•,,,

.

~-

.

;
,•

~

.

-,~

·;"";:--~

·~
l"

. :._•
."!.

',

~~.

~

,

'.
... . '
..,.,_

'

~

~
Ii

~r

n-

~,

,,,.

"The first ground rof the privilege] is the valid
need for protection of communications between high
Govrernment offi c 5als and those who advise and
assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties; the importance of this confidentiality is
too plain to require further discussion. Human
experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper
candor with a concern for appearances and for
their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process."

We held that the qualified privilege has "constitutional
underpinnings" .
(Id. 706). If th.e Court now holds, in
accordance with your draft, that there is a constitutional
right of access to information in the government's hands, ·1
suppose courts will be cal~ed upon to "balance" the
interests supporting the qualified right of governmentaJ
officials to confide~tialitv and the right of access. The
difficulty · is that normally a First Amendment !:'ight weighs
more heavily in the sca 1 es of a haJancing analysis than ·
almost any other right. I therefore suggest the
desirability of some broader caveat than the sentence on
page 17 of your draft.
There, you recognize the
confidentiality of "proceefings, conferences and meetings
of official bodies" (citing ~.E.?n!burg), but this language
c an be read as not includj ngthe type of confidentiality
recognized i.n ~i_~on.
·
.
In a different context, ;£he effectiveness of our
foreign intelligence (CIA) and the domestic intelligence
(FBI) services has been serious l y handicapped by the
investigations and the "exposes~ with which we .are all
familiar. An official of the Carter administration
(indeed, a member of the Cabinet) has told me within the
past three months that the broad ranging (and often
publicity seeking) "investigations" of the CIA over the
past couple of years have ~ubstantfally impaired its
capacity to serve our country effectively. My source is
neither the Secretary of Defense nor of State. I would
think it quite important to provide some specific
recognition of the need for. secrecy. Somethjng along the
following lines would do iJ:

•..

- . -.:,:-.'
"In addition, some functions of government essential to the protectjon of the public and
indeed our country's vital interests - necessarily
require a large measure of secrecy, subject to
appropriate legislative ov~!'.'-sight . "
Even the recognition of the qualified privilege of
confidentiality of government officials, and the inclusion
of the foregoing sentence, will not, prevent your opinion
from encouraging numerous attempts to obtain arguably
confidential and secret information. In short, we can
expect a good deal of litigation testing the rea~h of the
new principle that you articulate so well. But additions
along the lines I have suggested should give courts a strong
signal not to view the opinion as justifying intrusions on
confidentiality and secrecy where these are necessary to
the proper functioning of government. ·
In sum, I am enthusiastic about your op1n1on;
I do think it would be wise to make somewhat cleare4
the right of access.-~ necess;:lrily has·- limitations.
I •' am not circulating th'is ·: 1etter, to ttie
Conference, as I am hopeful you 'can make _; changes
enable .me to join you promP,t ly.
·
··

-

-
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 21, 1978

Re:

76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED

Dear Lewis:
Needless to say I am most gratified by your
letter, and I think your concern is entirely
justified. Do you think the suggested changes on
the enclosure are adequate?

Res7:lly,

Mr . Justice Powell
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and through the press. was adequate to survive constitutional challenge; institutional considerations justified denying the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in
tha.t case.
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of information at its source, abridged the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The answer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political
branches of government.' Moreover, there are unquestionably
occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own
conferences, [a.nd] the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session . ..." Branzburg v. Hayes , 408
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. 1 In such
situations the reasons for withholding information from the
public are both apparent and legitimate.~ ~

J.'I;,lrn

the case of grand jury proceeding~, for example, the secrecy rule
has been justified on several grounds:
"(1) to prevent, the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated ; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera~
tions, and to prevent. persons subject to indictment. or their friends from
importuning the grand ji.1rors ; (3) to prevent. subornation of perjury or·
tampering with the witnesses who ma.y testify before grand jury and later
appear at. the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and·
untrammeled. disclosures by persons who have information with respect to
the commi!)sion of crime!l; (5) to protect innocent a.ccused who is exoner.:.-

:C.n a,qd.i:ti.onJ ~ome ~1.mct.i:on13- o;fl gove:i:inment ~ essent;ia,l to
the. p;J;iotect;i;on of th.e pub;I,;t,c and t ndee.d o--qr count1t1y t:;:;
;v;t,t.ql, .i:nte.;r;ie.sts ·": nece.s:sa,!1;1~;1,y, reg:u;t.re. a, large measure of

sec;r;ec)!•<· ::;-l.lbj ec't to a:p J?popii~a,te leg±.sla,t j;,,ve oversight.

•

-

-
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Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft:
28/ In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705
we pointed out:

n. 15,

"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality.
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were
conducted in complete privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover,
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30
years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed
could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937)."
In recognizing the valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties, we explained that
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require
further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705.
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the press claim to a particular form of access. since the record
demonstra.ted that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and through the press. ,\;as adequate to survive constitutional challenge; institutional considerations justified denying the single, additional mode' of access sought by the press in
that case.
·
Here, in contrast. the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concea]~d from the genera] public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is
whether petitioner's policies. which cut off the flow of information a.t its source. abridged the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The answer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend-the operation of
mos
ernmental activity. Such matters involve questions
o policy hich generally must be resolved by the political
br
so government. Moreover. there are unquestionably
occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own _,,,,.,,,.
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies gather--·
ing in executive session . . . . " Branzburg v. Hn.~08
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S .. at
s~~h
situations the reasons for withholding information from the
public are both apparent and legitimate.~ 7::1./
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'}!/;,(1n the case of &land j~y proceeding~, for ; xample, the secrecy rule
has been justified on several grounds:
"(I) to prevent the esc.1pe of those whosP indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmo,:t frpedom to thP grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent pnsons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning thr grand jurors ; (3) to prevent rnbornation of perjury or·
tampering with the witnesses who may testify bPforr grand jury and later
appear at the trial of thosP indicted by it ; (4) to rncourage frpe and
untrammeled clisclo,;ures by person,; who have information with respect to
the commissiqn of crime:s; (5) to protect. innocent accused who is exoner'-·
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Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft:
28/ In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705
e pointed out:

n. 15,

"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality.
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were
conducted in complete privacy.
1 M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover,
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30
years after the Convention.
See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed
could have been written.
C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937)."

at<

I,n rece~i,qj :A.':3,l the valid need for protection of communications
c,rJ~
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties, we-e*p±-a--ined
..;::- that
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require
further discussion.
Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705.
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and through the press. was adequate to survive constitutional cha11enge; institutional con!'ilderations justified denying the single, additional mode of ac.~ss sought by the press in
that case.'
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of information at its source. abridged the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The answer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions
of policy which genera11y must be resolved by the political
branches of government. I J\1oreovN. there are unquestionably
occasions when governmental acti\·ity may properly be carried
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session . . . . " Branzburg v. Hayes, 408.
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S .. at 834.\ I In such
situations the reasons for withholding information from the
public are both apparent and legitimate:-:,-

w

,..:itt'Jn 1he r a~ of gr:rnd jur>· prorr<'ding:;, for r xample, the ::rrrery rule
}ias•b("('n jus1ified on se,·rrnl ground,;:
"(l) to prevrnt- the r sr.1pe of tho:;e who:-;r indic1m en1 may be contrmplated; (2) to in sure thr 111mo,:1 fm ·dom to tbr grand jury in i1s ddiberations, and to prrH·nt prr;.:ons !'11bjt>cl to indi ctm ent or 1heir frirnds from
importuning thr gra nd jurors; (3) to pn•n·nt :,,ubornation of perjury or·
tampr ring with thr witnr;.:sc->;:; who may 1f':-tify b r fore grand jury and later
appra r at. the trial of those indirted by it; (4) to encour:1ge frre and·
,mt ra mmeled cli:;rlo:;ures by 1wrsons who ha,·r informa1 ion with re:;1w.ct to
ihe rornmi5:;ion of crimes; (5) to prott>cl- innorent 11ccu::ed who is rxoner.:.-

In addition, some functions of government - essential
to the protection of the public and indeed our country's
vital interests - necessarily require a large measure
30/
of secrecy, subject to appropriate legislative oversight.

."
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Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft:
28/ In United States v. Nixon, . 418 U.S. 683, 705 _ n. 15,
we pointed out a that the Founders tµemselves followed a policy
of confidentiality:
'
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality.
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were
conducted in complete privacy.•• 1 M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover,
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30
years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed
could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937)."
also
United States v. Nixon, supra, we/recognizej
nAX&M~the
valid need for protection of communications
30/
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties, x~xgx~x~i~g~at
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require
further discussion.
Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705.
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·MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a preliminary injunction
requiring the Sheriff of Alameda County, Cal., to allow
representatives of the news media access to the county jail is
consistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817,
834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general
public."
Respondent KQED, Inc., operates a public service television
station in Oakland, Cal. It has televised a number of programs about prison conditions and prison inmates. KQED
reporters have been granted access to various correctional
facilities in the San Francisco Bay area, including San Quentin
'State Prison, Soledad Prison and the San Francisco County
Jails at San Bruno and San Francisco, to preparn program
material. They have taken their cameras and recorqing equipment inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed
inmates. No disturbances or other problems have occurred on
those occasions.
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the·
Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast
tep.orting a decisiQ.D of the. United Stat.es District Court finding;
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that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed
[at Santa Rita] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for
man or beast as a matter of law." 1 Petitioner is the Sheriff
of Alameda County and has general supervision and control of
the Santa Rita facility.2
On March 31, 1975, KQED reported the suicide of a prisoner
in the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita jail. That program
also carried a statement by a psychia.trist assigned to Santa
Rita to the effect that conditions in the Greystone facility were
responsible for illnesses of inmates. 3 Petitioner's disagreement with that conclusion was reported on the same newscast.
KQED requested permission to visit and photograph the
_a rea of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused,
advising KQED that it was his policy not to permit any access
to the jail by the news media. 'This policy w.as also invoked
by petitioner to deny subsequent requests for access to the jail
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged
· incidents within the facility.4 Except for a carefully supervised tour in 1972, the n~ws media were completely excluded
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this
action was commenced.,ll
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F . Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972).
Based on a personal visit to the facility, Judge Zirpoli reached the
"inescapable conclusion that Gr eystone should be razed to t he ground."
2 Petitioner has 'been employed by the Sheriff's Department for 30·
years, including five as commancling ·officer of the jail at Santa, Rita. He•
was elected to his present office in 1 97 4.
·
3 The psychiatrist was· discharged after the telecast.
4 Access was denied , for example, to cover stories of aJleged gang rapes·
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes ·
from t.he jail, Tr: 135-136.
5 A previous sheriff had conducted one "press tour" in 1972, attended
by reporters and c~meramen. But the facility had been "freshly scrubbed'"
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden to ask any questions of the.:
lPJP.ates_the): enoo~Jlter_ed, (Al?l?· 16-17.)._
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People,6 filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17,
1975. The complaint alleged that petitioner ha.cl provided no
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions
prevailing in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances ma.y
reach the public." lt further alleged that petitioner's policy
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the jail facility
violateq the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and
Santa Rita, facilities and generally preventing full and accurate
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6-7.
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a prelimin1:1,ry injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of
the news meqia, tqe ·sheriff of ·san Francisco County, and the
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in
other penaJ institutions and uniformly expressfld the opinion
that such cqverage had no harmful consequences and in faot
served a significant public purpose. 7
6 The NAACP alleged a "srecial concern with conditions at Sant.a Rita
because the prisoner population at t.he jail is disproportionately black, and
the members of the 'NAACP depend on the news media for information
about conditions in the jail so that they can meaningfully pa.rticipate in
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Complaint Paragraph 3.
Since no special relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the
parties have focused on t he claim of KQED.
7 The sheriff has a master's degree in criminology froµi the University
of California at Berkeley and 10 years experience in law en,forcement
with the San Francisco Police Depa.rtment. As sheriff he has genera[
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He
expressed the "opinion, based on my education and experience in Jaw
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an important contribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. Irt
my opinion jails are public institutio11s and the public has a right to know
what is being done with their tax dollars being spent on iail facilit.i.es an,d
program.,5._" App. ·15..
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The affidavit of the a,t torney for KQED described a series of
telephone conversations with counsel for the County between
May 12, 1975 and June 17, when this suit was filed. In the
first conversation, respondents' counsel expla.ined KQED's
problem regarding access to the Santa Rita facility. In the
second, County Counsel stated that a rule or regulation regarding press access would be forthcoming within a week. In the
third conversation, more than two weeks later, County Counsel
stated that no access rule had yet been developed, and agreed
to forward a copy of the prison rules which were then in effect
for maximum security inmates. 8 1 In the last communication,
on June 10, 1975. County Counsel stated that petitioner was
contemplating m~nthly public tours for 25 persons, with the
first tour tentatively scheduled for July 14. The tours, however, would not include the cell portions of Greystone and
would not allow any use of cameras or communication with
inmates. Respondents filed suit on June 17, 1975.
In a letter to the County Board ofSupervisors dated June 19,
1975, petitioner outlined a pilot public tour program along the
lines of that described to respondents' counsel. The Board
approved six tours. Petitioner then filed his answer and supporting affidavit explaining why he had refused KQED access
to the jail and identifying the recent changes in policy regarding access to the jail and communica.tion between inmates and
persons on the outside. Petitioner stated that if KQED's
request had been granted, he would have felt obligated to
honor similar requests from other representatives of the press
and this could have disrupted mealtimes, exercise times, visiting times, and court appearances of inmates. 9 He pointed out
8

The inmates at Santa Rita include pretail detainees as well as prisoners

who have · been convicted and sentenced. The rnles in effect on June 3,
1975, contained no rule on vre,;s access. Visiting was limited to three
bours on Sunday. All outgoing mail, ~xcept letters to judges or lawyers,
was inspected. The rule prohibited any mention of "the names or actions
10f any officers~' of the jajJ.
~ In c0J1t,rn.st to foe floodgate concerns exprns;;ed by vetitioners, th~

-
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that the mail regulations had recently been amended to delete
a prohibition against mentioning the qames or actions of any
correctional officers. Petitioner also stated that KQED had
been advised about the contemplated program of guided tours
before the suit was filed and that the tours had since been
approved and publicly announced. With respect to the scope
of the proposed tours, petitioner explained th~t the use or
cameras would be prohibited because it would not be possible
to prevent 25 persons with cameras from photographing
inmates and security operations. Moreover, communication
with inm11,tes would not be permitted because of excessive time
consumption, "problems with control" of inmates and visitors,
and a belief "that interviews would be excessively unwieldy." 10
An evidentiary hearing on tpe motion for a preliminary
injunction was held after the first four guided tours had taken
place. The evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a
means of obtaining infotmation about the inmates and their
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The
tours failed to enter certain areas of the jail.11 They afforded
no opportunity to photograph conditions within the facility,
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks
abov~ the cells from which guards can observe the inmates. 12
The tours provided no opportunity to question randomly
encountered inmates about jaii conditions. Indeed, to the
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of
access rules at that instittitiop. media requests to enter the facility a,ctually
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest tha,t the mere existence
of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the
closed institution require especially close scrutiny.
:io App., a,t 24.
11 The tour did not include LitUe Greystone, which was the subject ot
reports of beatings, rapes and poor cop.ditions, or the disciplina.ry cells.
12 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell,'"
of the "disciplin11,ry cells," or of t he interior of LittJe Greystone. In addii ion, the photograph of the dayroom omits the television monjt:0r that.
maintairu;: continuous observati® of the inmates and the open urinals.
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extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour,
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic picture
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition,
the fixed scheduling of the tours prevented coverage of newsworthy events at the jail.
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were completely booked and there was no assurance that any tour would
be conducted after December of 1975. The District Court
found that KQED had no access to the jail ~d that the broad
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological
·in terests.1 3
u "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa Rita has never experimented with a more liberal pre.~s policy than that presently in existence,
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no
recollection of hearing uf any disruption caused by the media at other
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he fea.red
that invasion of inmates• privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats
· of jail security would result from a more liberal press policy. While such
fears are not groundless, convincing testimony was offered that such fears
' can be substantially allayed.
"As to the inmates' privacy, the media, representatives commonly obtain
written consent from those inmates who are interviewed and/or photo. graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full
agreement. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial
publicity, consent can be obtajned not only from such inmates but also
from their counsel. J ail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result,
of a random interview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and
equipment brought, into the jail can be searched. yVhile Sheriff Houchins
expressed concern that photographs of electronic locking devices could be
· enlarged and studied in order to facilitate escape plans, he admit.tee! that
the inmates themselves ciln study and sketch the locking devices. Most
importantly, there was substantial tRStimony to the effect that ground
rules laid down by jail administ.rators, such as a biln on photographs of
security devices, are consistently respected by t,he media.
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence concerning the present media. policy
at Santa Rita, the Court. finds the plaintiffs have demonstra.ted irreparable
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of success on
the merits, a favorable public interest , and a balance of hardships which
to.u st be st.ruck in plaintiffs' favor." App,, at 69.
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The District Court thereafter issued ft preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioner "from denying to KQED news
personnel and responsible representatives of the news media
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at
reasonable times and hours," or from preventing such representatives "frqm utilizing photographic and sound equipment
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court,
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event,
should retain the right to de~iy access when jail tensions or
other special circumstances require exclusion.
Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 14 The Court of
Appeals a.ffirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under
review. 15 MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice,
stayed the mandate and in his opinion on the stay application
fairly stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari
to decide:
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access'
doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court
of . Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly
limited to the situation where there already existed substantial press and public access to the prison, then PeU
and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review by
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of
14 Two circuit judges granted a stay of the Dist-r ict Court's order pending disposit.ion of petitioner's a.ppeal.
15 546 F. 2d 284 ( 1976).
A petition for rehearing, a suggestion for
Tehearing en bane, and a motion to stay· the mandate were all denied by
the Ninth Circuit.

-

76-1310-0PINION

::B

HOUCHINS v. KQED, INC.

those cases, would be appropriate, although not neces~
sary." 429 U.S. 1341, 1344.
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the
decisions in Pell and Sa:cbe do not control the propriety of the
District Court's preliminary injunction. First, the unconstitutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a
·greater right of access ·to information regarding prison conditions than do other members of the public. Second, reiief
·tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded ~
:a representative of the press which is successful in proving that
it has been harmea by a constitutional violation and need not
·await the grant 'of relief to members of the general public who
may also have been injwed by petitioner's unconstitutional
access policy but ·have ndt y~t sought to vindicate their rights.

I
This litigation grew out of petitioner's refusal to allow
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the
'S anta Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institution of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by petitioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, therefore we must consider the relevance of the actions after
March 31, 1975, to the question whether a consdtutional violation had occurred.
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in
anticipation of litigation or following commencement of suit
does not deprive the court of power to decide whether the
previous course of conduct was unlawful. See United St(l,tes
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633. 1~
16

Moreover, along with the power to decide the merits, the Court's:
power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal condttct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunc..tive relief by protesta.tions of repentance and reform, especially wheitc
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'The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case
is apparent. When this suit was filed , there were no public
-tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion
of both the public and the press from those areas within the
Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate corre·spondence addressed to persons other than lawyers and judges
•and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the
•guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as
well as prison walls significantly abridged the opportunities for
communication of information about the conditions of confinement in the ·Santa Rita facility to the public.11 Therefore,
abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is a. probability of
•resumption." United States v. 'Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326,
333. When the District Court. issued the prelimina,ry injunction, there was
no assurance that the experiment.al public tours would continue beyond
the next month. Thus, it wotllti certainly have been reasonable for the
court to assume that, absent injunctive relief, the access to the inner por·tions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitigation
level.
17 Thus, when this suit was filed , there existed no opportunity for outsiders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at. Santa Rita. And
the mail regulations prohibited statements :..bout the character of the
treatment of prisoners·by correctional officers.
We cannot agree with petitioner that t he inmates' visitation and telephone privileges were reasonable alternative means of informing the public at large about conditions within Santa Rit:t. Neither offered an oppor·tunit.y to observe •those,conditions. Even if a member of the general public or a representative of the press were fortunate enough to obtajn the
name of an inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included
the inmate's place of confinement. The jajl regulations do not indicate
that, an inmate in the minimum security portion of the jail may enlist
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of the
general public to complain of the conilitions of confinement . App. 38.
Ever~ if a maximum security inmate mny make collect telephone oalls, it
· is unlikely that a member of the general public or representative of the
press would accept the charges, especially without prior knowledge of tllf)
,,call's communicative purpose.
Although sentenced prisoners may not be interviewed under any cir-

-

76-1310-0PINION

10

HOUCHINS v. KQED, INC.

even if there would not have been any constitutional violation
·h ad the access policies adopted by petitioner following commencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access
were constitutional.
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court stated
that "newsmen ha.ve no constitutional right of access to prisons
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from
access to information about prison conditions would avoid
constitutional scrutiny;1 8 Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests
the contrary.
cumstances, pretrial detainees may, according to petitioner, be interviewed
with the consents of the inmates', defense coun,sel and prosecutor and with
an order from fhe court,. Not only would such an interview take place
outside the confines of the jail, ·but. the requirement of a court order makes
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the
jail and its inmates.
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with
infonnation regarding the release of prisoners which, according to petitioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the conditions of their recent confinement. This informal offer was apparently only
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford
the public any opportunity to observe t11e conditions of confinement .
He11ce, the mea ns available at the time this suit was instituted for
informing the gE'neral public a.bout conditions in the Santa Rita jail were,
as a practical·matter, nonexist~mt.
1 8 In Zemel v. R usk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, the Court said:
"The right to speak and pub lish does not carry with it the unrestrained·
right to gather informat ion." (Emphasis added.)
And in Branibu7'g v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681:
"We do not question the significance of free sprech, press, or assembly
to the country's welfa re. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
· qualify for First Amendment protection ; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscera.ted."
"Both statements imply that there is a right to acquire knowledge that
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In that case, representatives of the press claimed the right to
interview specifica.lly designa~d inmates. In evaluating this
claim, the Court did not simply inquire whether prison officials
allowed members of the general public to conduct such interviews. Rather, it canvl:l,Ssed the opportunities already available for both the public and the press to acquire information
regarding the prison and its inmates. And the Court found
that the policy of prohibiting interviews with inmates specifically designated by the press was "not part of an attempt by
the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons." The challenged restriction on access, which was imposed only after
experience revealed that such interviews posed disciplinary
problems, was an isolated limitation on the efforts of the press
to gather information a.bout those conditions. It was against
the background of a record which demonstra.ted that both the
press and the general public were "accorded full opportunities
to observe prison conditions," 19 that the Court considered the
constitutionality of the single restraint on access challenged
in Pell.
The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state
policy of concealing prison conditions from the press, or a
policy denying the press any opportunity to observe those
conditions, could have been justified simply by pointing to like
'

derives protection from the First Amendment. See Branzburg, supra, at
728 n. 4, STEWART, J., dis&mting.
19 "The Department of Corrections regularly conducts public tours
t hrough the prisons for the benefit of interest,ed citizens. In addition,
newsmen are permitted to visit both the maximum security and minimum
security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any subject to any inmates whom they might encounter. If security considerations permit, corrections personnel will step aside to permit such interviews
to be confidential. Apart from general access to all parts of the institutions, newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons to interview inmates
selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if a
newsman wishes to write a. story on a particular prison program, he is
permitted to sit in on group meetings and to interview the inmate pa.r .
ticipan.ts." 417 U.S., at 830.
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concealment from, and denial to, the general public. If that
were not true, there would have been no need to emphasize
the substantial press and public access reflected in the record
of that case. 20 What Pell does indicate is that the question
whether respondents established a probability of prevailing on
their constitutiona.l claim is inseparable from the question
whether petitioner's policies unduly restricted the opportunities of the general public to learn about the conditions of
confinement in Santa Rita jail. As in Pell, in assessing its
adeqµacy, the totaJ access of the public and the press must
be considered.
Here, the broad restraints on access to information regarding
operation of the jail that prevailed on the date this suit was
instituted are p1ainly disclosed by the record. The public and
the press had consistently been denied any access to those·
20 Nor would it have been necessary to note, as the Pell opinion did, the
fact that the First Amendment protects the free flow of information to
the public:
"The constitutional guarantee of a. free press 'assures the maintenance·
of our political system and an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S..
374, 389 (1967), and secures 'tjie paramount, public interest in a free flow
of information t.o the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) . See also New York '.('imes Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254 (1964). By the same token, '[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this CQurt bearing a, heavy presumption
agaillh't its constitutional validity.' New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U. S. 713,- 714 (1971); ·organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971) ; Bantam Books, Inc . v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Correla.tively,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public
t.o receive such infonnation and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U. S., at ..762-763; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564

' (1969) .

"In Brmizburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court went further
and acknowledged that 'news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' id., at 707, for 'without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,' id., at 681.'' 41
·lJ:~.s.,.at. 832.,-833•.

r
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portions of the Santa Rita facility where inmates were confined
and there had been excessive censorship of inmate correspondence. Petitioner's no-access policy, modified only in the
wake of respondents' resort to the courts, could survive constitutional scrutiny only if the Constitution affords no protection
to the public's right to be informed about conditions within
those public institutions where some of its members are confined because they have been charged with or found guilty of
criminal offenses.
II
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective
of the First Amendment to the Constitution.21 It is for this
reason that the First Amendment protects not only the dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas. See,
e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408409; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762-763. 22 Thus,
in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison
regulations authorizing excessive censorship of outgoing inmate
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.
2d 1335, 1346, n. 8 (CA7 1973). So here, petitioner's prelitigation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement
21 See, e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U. S. 748, 764-765; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 77 ; New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-270 ; Associated Press v . United
States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U . S. 233, 250.
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 , 726 n . 2 (STEWAR'r, J.,
dissenting.)
22 See also Lamont v. Postmaster General,, 381 U. S. 301; Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. /?CC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 ; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U . S. 141 ; Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U. S. 501.
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on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the
intended communication.
In addition to safeguarding the right of one individual to
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amendment serves an essential societal function. 2 3 • Our system of
self-government_ assumes the existence of an informed citizenry.24 As Madison wrote :
"A popular Government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or
a tragedy; or perha.ps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge
gives." Writings of Jarpes Madison f03 (G. Hurst ed.
1910).

It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free of governmental -restraints. Without some pro23 " What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion ·of governmental affairs. No
· aspect of that constitution.al guarantee is more treasured than its protection of the a.bility of our people throu~h free and open debate to consider·
and resolve their own destiny . . . . ·it embodies our Na.tion's commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith tha.t the surest
course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views
as public issues. And ·public debate must not only be unfettered; it must
also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas
as well as the right of free expression.'r Sa:xb·e v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U. S. 843, 862-863 (POWELL, J ., dissenting) .
24 See A. Meiklejohn, ·Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government

26 (1948) :

"Just as far as . .. the· citizen,s who are to decide an issue are denied ·
· acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criti, cism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be illconsidered, ill-balanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutila- tion of the thinking process of the community against which the First.'
.Am-endment to the Constitution is directed.
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tection for the acquisition of information about the operation
of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would
be stripped of its substance. 25
For that reason information-gathering is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protection. See, e. g., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681; Pell v. Procun'ier, 417 U.S., at 833;
"a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist." 26
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protection is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and
importance.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, representatives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising
revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the
members of an organized society, united for their common
good, to impart and acquire information about their common
interests." / d., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle
25 Admittedly, the right to receive or a,cquire information is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. But "the protection of the Bill of
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from ... abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemiruttion of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing adherents are not, free to receive
and consider them. It would be a. barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S., at
380 (BRENNAN , J., concurring) . It. would be an even more barren marketplace that had willing buyers and sellers and no meaningful information
to exchange.
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J., dissenting):
"No less important to the news disseininat,ion process is the ga,thering of
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised. A,ccordingly, a right to gather news, of
'!Jome dimensions, must exist."
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in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisementsthe so-called "taxes on know ledge" :
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and
controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity
for, the acquisition of knowledge ·by the people in respect
of their governmental affairs. , . . The aim of the struggle {against those taxes] was ... to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.
Upon the correctness of this conclusi911, the very characterizations of the exactions as . . 'taxes on knowledge' sheds
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an informed and eri:lightened public opinion was the thing at
stake." Id., at "247.
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle,
the Court held:
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.
The tax involved here is bad . . . because, in light of its
history and its present setting. it is seen to be a deliberate
and calculated device . . . to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties." Id. , at 250.
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of the
public generally" 21 is also implicit in the doctrine that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In Pell it was unnecessary to
consider the extent of the public's right of access to information regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate
27 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U. S., at 864.
-tlissenting.)

(POWELL,

J.,
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the press olaim to a particular form of access, since the record
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and through the press, was adequate to survive constitutional cµaUenge; institutional considerations justified denying the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in
that case.
Here, in contrast. the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of information ,at its source. abridged the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The answer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political
branches of government.2 8 Moreover, there are unquestionably occasions when governmental activity may properly be
carried on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and
the press are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, [and] the meetings of other official
bodies gathering in executive session . . . . " Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 834.2
1)

28 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 n. 15, we pointed out
that the Founders themselves followed a policy of confidentiality:
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete
privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
pp xi-xxv (1911). Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed
for more than 30 years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong.,
1st Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most- of the Framers acknowledged that without
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been
written . C. Warren, The Making of tJ10 Constitution 134-139 (1937) ."
29 In the case of grand jury proceedings, for example, the secrecy rule
bas been justified on several grounds :
" ( 1) to prevent the escape of those whose jnclictment may be con tern,.
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In addition , some functions of government--essential to
the protection of the public and indeed our country's vital
interests-necessarily require a large measure of secrecy, subject to appropriate legislative oversight. 30 In such situations
the reasons for withholding information from the public are
both apparent and legitima.te.
In this case, however, "[r]espondents do not assert a right
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in
any way the decisionmaking processes of governmental officials." 31 They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of
concealing prison conditions from the public. Those conditions a.re wholly without claim to confidenti11lity. While prison
officials have an interest in the time and manner of public
acquisition of information about the institutions they administer, no one even suggests that there is any legitimate,
· penological justification for concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens are being confined.32
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand ' jurors ; (3) to prevent suborna.tion of perjury or
tampering with the witnesses who ma.y testify before grand jµry and later
appear a.t the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have in.formation with respect to
the commission of crimes ; (5) to protect innocent a.ccused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact. that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of
guilt,." United States v. Procter & Gamble. 356 U. S. 677, 681 n. 6.
30 In United States v. Nixon , s-upra, we also recognized the valid need
for protection of communicat.ions between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties, explaining t-hat "the importarice of this confidentiality is too plain
to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who
expect public disseminat ion of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." Id .. at 705.
31 Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U. S., at 861 (POWELL, J.,
dissenting) .
32 The Court in Saxbe noted that " 'prisons are institutions where pub- .
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The reasons which militate in favor of providing special
protection to the flow of information to the public about
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a democratic society. Not only are they public institutions, financed
with public funds and administered by public servants; 33
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system.
The citizens confined therein are tempora.rily, and sometimes
permanently, deprived oi their liberty as a result of a trial
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By
express command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding
,must be a "public trial. 1' 34 It is important not only that the
trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have
confidence in the integrity of the proceeding. 3 " That public
interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is
treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabillie access is generally limited.' " 417 U. S., at 849 (citation omitted).

This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological interests served by regulating access, e. g., security and conlinement. But conooa.Iing prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate
objectives.
33 "The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that, t hey maintain,
and t,he experiences
the individuals in carcerated therein a.re all matters
of legitimate societal interest and concern." Saxbe v. Washing ton Post Co.,
417 U.S., at 861 (Pow"ELL, J., dissenting).
34 In all criminal prosecut,ions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public ttjal, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein t.he crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations; ..." U . S. Const., Amend. VI.
35 "The right to a public trial is not only to protect the accused but to
protect as much the public''s right to k~ow what goes on when men's lives
and liberty are at stake ...." Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F. 2d 791, 792 (CA4
1965). See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270: "The knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
-public opinion is an effective restraint QU possible abuse of judicial power.''

of
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itation. While a ward of the State and subject to its stern
discipline, he retains constitutional protections against cruel
and unusual punishment, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S.
97, a protection which may derive more practical support from
access to information about prisons by the public than by
occasional litigation in a busy court."
Some inmates-in Santa Rita, a substantial number-are
pretrial detainees. Though confined pending trial, they have
not been convicted of an offense against society and are
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain penologjca:.1
objectives, i. e., punishment. deterrence and rehabilitation,
which are legitimate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inapplicable to pretrial detainees."' Society has a special interest
in ensuring that unconvicted ·citizens are treated in accord with
their sta.tus.
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public
and the press had been consistently denied any access to the
inner portions of the Santa Rita jail, that there had been
excessive censorship of inmate correspondence, and that there
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow
of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether
0

36
In fact, conditions within the GrPystone portion of thP Santa Rita ·
facility had been found to con:stitnt€ cniel and unusual punishment ..
Brenneman v. Mailigan, 343 F. Supp.128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). The
public's inter est in ensuring that tlwse conditions have been remedied is
apparent. For, in finaJ analysis, it ii:l the cit izens who bear responsibility
for the treatment accorde·d those confined within penal institutions.
37
"Incarceration aft.er conviction is imposed to punish, to deter, and to
rehabilitate the convict.. . . . Some freedom to accomplish the:;<" ends must
of necessity be alfordpd prison pen;onn<"l. Convers<"l?, whel'E' incarceration
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, puni8hment,, :md rPtribution
are not legitimate funct,ions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is
but a temporary holding operation , and the-ir neces,,;ary frPedom of action
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in such a context are
·out of harmony with thP presumption of in,nocence." Anderson v. Nasser,
4'38 F:. 2d 183; 190 (CA5 1971 ) ..
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respondent established 11, likelihood of prevailing on the merits
did not depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to
special treatment beyond that accorded the public at large.
Rather, the probable existence of a constitutional violation
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic
community access to knowledge about how its servants were
treating some of its members who have been committed to
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of
information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.as

III
The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duties
on petitioner that may not be required by the Constitution
itself. The injunction was not an abuse of discretion for
either of these reasons.
If a litigant can prove that he has suffered specific harm
from the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is
entirely proper for a court to gran~ relief tailoreq to his needswithout attempting to redress all the mischief that the policy
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different
methods of remedying a violation of that right may sometimes
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or
the other. Preliminary relief could therefore appropriafely be
When fundamental freedoms of citizens have been at stake, the Court
has recognized that a.n abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a
wide variety of governmental policies. See, e. g., American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449;
Boyd v. United Stat_es, 116 U .. S.. 6J6,; G.rosiean v.. American Press Co., 291
38

11.. ~, 2..aa..
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awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it was
affected by the challenged policy without also granting specific
relief to the general public. Indeed , since our adversary
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies
between specific litigants, it woµld have been improper for the
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who
have not requested separate relief. Accordingly, even though
the Constitution provides the press with no greater right of
access to information than that possessed by the public at
large, a preliminary injunction is not invalid simply because it
awards special retief to a successful litigant which is a representative of the press.31)
Nor is there anything novel about injunctive relief which
goes beyond a mere prohibition against repetition of previous
unlawful conduct. In situations which are both numerous and
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirmative steps to eli.ininate the effects of a violation of law even
though the law itself imposes- no duty to take the remedial
39

Moreover, the relief granted to KQED will redound to the benefit of
members of the public interested in obtaining information about conditions in the Santa Rita jail. The press may have }lo grea,t.er constitutional
right to information about prisons than that possessed by t he general public. But when the press does a.cqui re information and disseminate it to
the public, it performs :m important societ.a.l function.
"In seeking out the news the press t herefore acts as an agent of the public at large. · It is the means by whi ch the people receive t hat free flow of
information and· ideas essential to inte1ligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful cont rol over the politica.I process, the
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of t he
First Amendment. " Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U.S., at, 863-864
(PowELL, J., dissenting) .
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J .,
dissenting) .
In the coqtext of fashioning a, remedy for a violation of rights p rotected
by the First. Amendment, consideration of t he role of the press in our
~ iety is appropriate.
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action decreed by the court.4° It follows that if prison regulations and policies have unconstitutionally suppressed information and interfered with communication in viqlation of the
First A1n~ndment, the District Court has the power to require,
at least temporarily, that the channels of communication be
opened more widely than the law would otherwise require in
order to let relevapt facts, which may have been concealed,
come to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of
that preliminarily awarded in this case would be "aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation ," Milliken v. ].3radley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, lt is perfectly
clear that the Court had power to enter an inj~nction which
was broader than a mere prohibition against ~lle~al conduct.
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor
would it be appropriate for us to review the scope of the
ordef.41 The order was preliminary in character, and is subject
to revision in the light of experience and such evidence and
argument as m1ty be presented before the litigation is finally
concluded.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL

4 ° For au exteI1Sive d'iscussion of this practice in the context of desegre-gation decrees, see the Court's opi11ion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley,
433 u. s. 267.
41 We note, however, t hat the Dist rict Court was p resented with sub·stantial evidence indicat.ing that the use of cameras and interviews with
randomly selected in,mates neither jeopardized security nor threatened'.
legitimate penological interests in ot.her prisons where such access wa~;
~rmitt®,. SEl.El. Pr.ocunier v. :Martinez, 416, U. S.,, a.t 4.14 n .. 14.
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Dear John:
Re:
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I will be writing in this case. If my
position does not cover the views of Byron and
Bill Rehnquist, they,too,may have something to say.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:
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April 24 , 1978

.
Re: No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED, Inc .
Dear John,
Try as I may, I cannot bring myself
to agree that a county sheriff is constitutionally
required to open up a jail that he runs to the
press and the public . Accordingly, I shall not
be able to subscribe to the opinion you have circulated, affirming the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
My tentative view, which may not
stand up, is that it would be permissible in this
case to i ssue an injunction assuring pre ss access equivalent to existing public access, but
not the much broader injunction actually issued
by the District Court . I shall in due course circulate an expression of these views .
Sincerely yours,
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Mr . Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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Houchins v. KQED, Inc.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have devoted a substantial amount of time on
a dissent in this case with some emphasis on systems of
citizen oversight procedures which .exist in many states.
Some have fallen into disuse., but these can be traced back
to colonial days when all public institutions were subject
to citizen surveillance.
This approach, rather than pushy TV people interested
directly in the sensational, is the way to a solution.
I
will be circulating my views in due course.
I agree with
Potter's view that media have a right of access but not
beyond that of the public generally.
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Since John's opinion has been "in limbo" for
some time, I have put my hand to an alternative,
proposing reversal.
I send it in "Wang draft" and in less than the
final form I would circulate normally. If there is
enough support for this result, I am willing to put
in more time on refinements.
Regards,
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concu r ring in the

.,_.....

The First and Fourteenth Amendme nts do not guarant~

~

the public a right of access to information generated or

controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press a ny
basic right of access superior to that of the public
generally.

-~ )

~~

7he Constitution does no more than assure the

public a nd the press equal access once government has ope ned
its doors.~/

Accordingly, I agree substantially with what

the opinion of the Chief Justice has to say on that score.
We part comp any, however, in applying these
abstractions to the facts of this case.

Whereas he appea rs to

view "equal access" as meaning access that is identical in all
respects, I believe that the concept of equal access must be
acco rd ed more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical
di s tinctions between the pres s and the gener a l public.

J~/.2,~~~

~~~.

- - - - -_-*_/__F_o_r_c_e_s and f a ctors other th an the Cons 6

u~ ~

& ~~

mus~ determine what g<?vernment--held · data ~ re to. be rn~de
available to the public. See, e.g., New York Time s Co. v
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 7 23-::"}30 -(co ns 1.1rring opinion) .
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foreclose the possibility of further relief for KQED on
remand.

In my view, the availability and scope of future

permanent injunctive relief must depend upon the extent of
access then permitt e d the p11blic, and the decree must be f r amed
to accommodate equitably the constitutional role of the press
and the i n stitutional requi re me n ts of the jail.
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Dear Potter:
Re:

76-1310

Houchins v. KQED

In light of your concurring opinion I will add
some thoughts along the following lines:
there are
literally dozens of people -- law teachers, judges,
penologists, writers, lawyers--. who tour prisons (as
I did for 25 years in Europe and U.S.A.). Many of
them write books, articles, or give lectures or a
combination.
I'm sure you will agree they have the
same rights as a TV reporter doing a "documentary."
Can they have greater First Amendment rights than
these others whose form and certainty of communications
is not so fixed?
This, of course, goes to the "debate" on the "special"
status of those who regularly or semi-regularly use
newspapers or broadcast facilities and reach a larger
audience than a Law School, a Judicial Conference, or a
Conference on Corrections.
I do not believe First
Amendment rights can be circumscribed by the scope of
the audience.
If so, the early pamphleteers who could
afford only 100 sheets were "suspect."
I will try to be along soon with this enlargement
with some emphasis on the fact that a team of TV
cameramen (camera-persons!) will tend to produce far
more disruption than the serious student or judge,
lawyer, or penologist who wants to exercise First
Amendment rights with a s 7 ewhat different objective.

{Af)ar

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 24, 1978

Re:

No. 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the

Conference
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JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1978

No. 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED

Dear Chief:
Although I was a solid join with respect to your earlier
draft, your circulation of June 9th (second draft) leaves me
much less convinced. While I am perfectly willing to join in
any accommodation as to language or minor points, the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 14 and ending at the
top of page 15, and the new material at the top of page 8,
both seem to me to weaken the thrust of your opinion. I will
certainly not jump ship on you at this point, and would be
happy to offer any suggestions that might both satisfy me and
accomplish your goal of getting a Court; but with the language
which I have referred to in its present state, I think you will
have to mark me as "dubitante", as FF would have said.
Sincerely,

~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

-

-

~1tpumt <!fourt of t!rt ~ t h j;taua
~aatrmgnm. tfl. <!f. 20ffeJ!.,

CHAMBERS OF"

June

JUSTIC E BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

76-1310 - Ho uchins v . KQED

Dear Chief,
If the First Amendment requires a government to turn
over information about its prisons on the demand of the press
or to open its files and properties not only to routine inspections but for filming and public display, it would be
difficult to contain such an unprecedented principle. I would
suppose there are many government operations that are as important for the public to know about as prisons, or more so;
yet I cannot believe that the press has a constitutional right
to be at every administrator's elbow and to read all of his
mail. To start down this road would surely necessitate working
out a series of constitutionally authorized exemptions from the
duty of state governments to submit themselves to daily or
periodic auditing by the press.
This is not to say that the availability of accurate
information about government is not essential or to deny the
important role of the press in this regard. But I resist
taking over what is essentially a legislative task and by
reinterpreting the First Amendment assigning to ourselves and
other courts the duty of determining whether the state and
Federal Governments are making adequate disclosures to the
press.
I join your opinion and hope that it connnands a majority.
Sincerely yours,

~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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June 13, 1978

JUST ICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re;

No. 76,,;.1310 - Houch;i.ris v; KQED; ·!rte.

Dear Chief;

I should be narked out of this one.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc;

The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76--1310
Thomas L. Houchins, Sheriff of
On Writ of Certiorari to the
the County of Alameda,
United States Court of
California, Petiti0ner,
Appeals for the Ninth
v.
Circuit.
KQED, Inc., et al.

[June -, 1978]
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The Court holds that the scope of press access to the San:ta
Rita jail required by the preliminary injunction issued against
petitioner is inconsistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier,
417 U. S. 817, 834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the
general public" and therefore the injunction was an abuse of
the District Court's discretion. I disagree.
Respondent KQED, Inc .. has televised a number of programs
about prison conditions and prison inmates, and its reporters
have been granted access to various correctional facilities in
the San Francisco Bay area, including San Quentin State
Prison, Soledad Prison and the San Francisco County Jails at
San Bruno and San Francisco, to prepare program material.
They have taken their cameras and recording equipment
inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed inmates.
No disturbances or other problems have occurred on those·
occasions.
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the·
Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast
reporting a decision of the United States District Court finding·
that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed"
[a,t. Santa Rita] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for

•
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man or beast as a matter of law.'' ' On March 31 , 1975, KQED
reported the suicide of a prisoner in the Greystone portion of
the SaJ1ta Rita jail. That program also carried a statement by
a psychiatrist assigned to Santa Rita to the effect that conditions in the Greystone facility were responsible for illnesses of
inmates. 2 Petitioner's disagreement with that conclusion wa&
reported on the same newscast.
KQED requested permission to visit and photograph the
area of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused,
advising KQED that it was his policy not to permit any access
to the jail by the news media. This policy was ·also invoked
by petitioner to deny subsequent requests for access to the jail
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged
incidents within the facility." Except for a carefully supervised tour in 1972, the news media were completely excluded
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this
action was commenced: :Moreover. the prison rules provided
that all outgoing mail. except letters to judges and lawyers,
would be inspected; the rules also prohibited any mention
in outgoing correspondence of the names or actions of any
correctional officers.
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People,5 filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17,
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F . Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972).
Based on a personal visit to the facility, Judge Zirpoli reached the
"inescapable conclusion that Greystone should be razed to the ground ."
2 The psychiatrist wa,; discharged after the teleca:;t,.
3 Access was denied , for example, to cover stories of alleged gang rapes
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes
from the jail, Tr. 135-136.
4 A previous sheriff had conducted one " press tour'' in 1972, attended
by reporters and cameramen. But the facility had been "freshly scrubbed''
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden, to ask any questions of the
inmates they encountered (App. 16-17) .
. "The NAACP alleged a "special concern with conclitions at Santa Rita
because the prisoner population a.t the jail is disproportionately black, and
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1975. The complaint alleged that petitioner had provided no
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions
prevailing in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances may
reach the public." It further alleged that petitioner's policy
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the jail facility
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and
Santa Rita facilities and generally preventing full and accurate
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6--7.
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of
the news media, the Sheriff of San Francisco County, and the
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in
other penal institutions and uniformly expressed the opinion
that such coverage had no harmful consequences and in fact
served a significant public purpose."
In a letter to the County Board of Supervisors dated two
days after this suit was instituted, petitioner proposed a pilot
public tour program. He suggested monthly tours for 25
the members of the NAACP depend on the news media for information
about conditions in the jail so that they can meaningfully participate in
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Complaint Paragraph 3.
Since no specia.J relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the
parties have focused on the claim of KQED.
6 The sheriff had a master's degree in criminology from the University
of California, at Berkeley and 10 yea.rs experience in la.w en,forcement ,
with the San Francisco Police Department. As sheriff he had genera.I
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He
expressed the "opinion, based on my education and experience in law
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an important contribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. In
my opinion jails are public institutions and t.he public has a right to know
what is being done with their tax dollars being spent on jail facilities an,d.
programs:'' App. 15.
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persons, with the first tentatively scheduled for July 14. The
tours. however. would not include the cell portions of Greystone and would not allow any use of cameras or communication
with inmates. The Board approved six such tours. Petitioner then filed his answer and supporting a.flidavit explaining
why he had refused KQED access to the jail and identifying
the recent changes in policy regarding access to the jail and
communication between inmates and persons on the outside.
Petitioner stated that if KQED's request had been granted, he
would have felt obligated to honor similar requests from other
representatives of the press and this could have disrupted
mealtimes. exercise times, visiting times. and court appearances of inmates.' He pointed out that the mail regulations
had recently been amended to delete a prohibition against
mentioning the names or actions of any correctional officers.
,vith respect to the scope of the proposed tours. petitioner
explained that the use of cameras would be prohibited because
it would not be possible to prevent 25 persons with cameras
from photographing inmates and security operations. Moreover, communication with inmates would not be permitted
because of excessive time consumption , "problems with control" of inmates and visitors, and a belief "that interviews
would be excessively unwieldy.' ' 8
An evidentiary hearing on the motion for a preliminary
injunction was held after the first four guided tours had taken
place. The evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a
means of obtaining information about the inmates and their
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The
7 In contrast to the floodgate concerns expressed by petitioners, the
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of
access rules at that institution media requests to enter the facility actually
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest that the mere existence
·of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the
·closed institution reqmre especially close scrutiny.
s App ., at '.24.
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tours failed to enter certain areas of the jail.~ They afforded
no opportunity to photograph conditions within the facility,
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks
above the cells from which guards can observe the inmates.1. 0
The tours provided no opportunity to question randomly
encountered inmates about jail conditions. Indeed, to the
extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour,
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic picture
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition,
the fixed scheduling of the tours prevented coverage of newsworthy events at the jail.
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were completely booked and there was no assurance that any tour would
be conducted after December of 1975. The District Court
found that KQED had no access to the jail and that the broad
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological
interests. 11
9 The tour did not include Little Greystone, which was the subject of
reports of beatings, ra.pes and poor conditions, or the disciplinary cells.
10 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell,"
of the "disciplinary cells," or of the interior of Little Greystone. In addition, the photograph of the day room omits the television monitor that
maintains continuous observation of the inmates and the open urinals.
11 "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa Rita has never experimented with a more liberal press policy than that presently in existence,
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no
recollection of hearing of any disruption caused by the media at other
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he feared
that invasion of inmates' privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats
of jail securit,y would result from a more liberal press policy. While such
£ea.rs are not groundless, convincing testimony was offered that such fears
can be substantially allayed.
" As to the inmates' priva.cy, the media representa,tives commonly obtajn
written consent from those inmates who are interviewed and/or photo·graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full
.agreement. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial

-

76-1310-DISSENT
6

HOUCHINS v. KQED, INC.

The District Court thereafter issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioner "from denying to KQED news
personnel and responsible representatives of the news media
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at
reasnnable times and hours," or from preventing such representatives "from utilizing photographic and sound equipment
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court,
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event,
should retain the right to deny access when jail tensions or
other special circumstances require exclusion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under review. 12
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice. stayed the
mandate and in his opinion on the sta.y application fairly
stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari to
decide:
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access'
publicity, consent <;an be obtained not only from such inmates but also
from their counsel. Jail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result,
of a random intefview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and
equipment brought into the jail can- be searched. While Sheriff Houchins
expressed c~ncern that photographs of elect ronic locking devices could be
en larged and stt;died in order to facilitate escape plans, he admitted that
the inmates t hemselves can study and sketch t he locking devices. Most
importantly, there was substantia l t estimony to the effect that ground
rules laid down by jail administrators, such as a ban on photographs of
security devices, are consistently respected by the media.
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence concerning the present, media policy
at Santa Rita, the Court finds the plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of success on
the merits, a favorable public interest, and a balance of hardships which
must be struck in plaintiffs' favor." App., at 69.
12
546 F. 2d 284 (1976) .
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doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court
of Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly
limited to the situation where there already existed substantial press and public access to the prison, then Pell
and Sa.1;be are not necessarily dispositive, and review by
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of
those cases, would be appropriate, although not necessary." 429 U. S. 1341, 1344.
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the
decisions in Pell and SO,Xbe do not control the propriety of the
District Court's preliminary in junction. First, the unconstitutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a
greater right of access to information regarding prison conditions than do other members of the public. Second, relief
tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded to
a representative of the press which is successful in proving that
it has been harmed by a constitutional violation and need not
await the grant of relief to members of the general public who
may also have been injured by petitioner's unconstitutional
access policy but have not yet sought to vindicate their rights.

I
This litigation grew out of petitioner's refusal to allow
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the
Santa Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institution of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by petitioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, therefore, it is necessary to consider the relevance of the actions
after March 31. 1975 , to the question whether a constitutional
viola,tion had occurred.
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in
-~ nt_icipatiQn of litigation or following_ commencement of suit,
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,does not deprive the court of power to decide whether thti
-previous course of conduct was unlawful. See United Stateg
v. W. 1'. Gra.nt Co., 345 U. S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633. 13
'The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case
is apparent. When this suit was filed, there were no public
tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion
of both the public and the press from those areas within the
'Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate correspondence addressed to persons other than lawyers and judges
and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the
·guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as
well as prison walls significantly abridged the opportunities for
communication of information about the conditions of confinement in the Santa Rita facility to the public.14· Therefore,
13
MorPover, alorig with the powt'r to decide the merits, the Court's
power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal conduct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when
a.bandonment seems timed to ru1ticipa.te suit, and there is a probability of
-resumption." United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326,
'333. When the District Court issued the preliminary injunction, there was
no assurance that the experimental public tours would continue beyond
the next month. Thus, it would certainly have been reasonable for the
court to assume that, absent injunctive relief, tbe access to t1ie inner portions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitiga.tion
level.
11
Thus, when this suit was filed, there existed no opportunity for outsiders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at Santa. Rita. And·
the mail regulations prohibited sta.tements about the character of the
treatment of prisoners by correctional officers.
I cannot agree with petitioner that the inmates' visitation and telephone
privilege,;; were rea:,;onable alternative means of informing the public
at large about conditions within SaJ1ta Rita. Neither offered an opportunity to observe those conditions. Even if a member of the genera.! public or a representativ~ of the press were fortunate enough to obtain the
name of aJ1 inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included
the inmate's place of confinement. The jail regulatfons do] not indicate ·
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even if there would not have been any constitutional violation
had the access policies adopted by petitioner following commencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access
were constitutional.
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court sta.ted
that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from
access to information about prison conditions would avoid
constitutional scrutiny.rn Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests
the contrary.
that an inmate in the m1mmum security portion of the jail may enlist
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of the
general public to complain of the conditions of confinement. App. 38.
Even if a maximum security inmate may make collect telephone calls, it
is unlikely that a member of the general public or representative of the
press would accept the charges, especia.lly without prior knowledge of the
ca.ll's communicative purpose.
Although sentenced prisoners may not be interviewed under any circumstances, pret,ria1 detainees may, according to pet.itioner, be interviewed
with the consents of the inmates, defense coun,.gel and prosecutor and with
an order from the court. Not only would such an interview take place
outside the confines of the jail, but the requirement of a court order makes
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the
jail and its inmates.
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with
information regarding the release of prisoners which, according to petitioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the conditions of their recent confinement. This informal offer was apparently only
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford
the public any opportunity to observe the conditions of confinement.
Hence, the means available at the time this suit was instituted for
informing the general public about conditions in the Santa Rita jail were,,
:as a practical matter, nonexistent.
1 5 ln Zemel, v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17, the Court said:
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in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison
regulations authorizing excessive censorship of outgoing inmate
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.
2d 1335, 1346 n. 8 (CA7 1973). So here, petitioner's prelitigation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement
on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the
intended communication.
In addition to safeguarding the right of one individual to
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amendment serves an essential societal function. 20 Our system of
self-government assumes the existence of an informed citizenry.21 As Madison wrote:
"A popular Government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or
a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever gov20 "What is a,t stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free ptiblic discussion of governmental affairs. No
aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider
and resolve their own destiny. . . . It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest
course for developing sound national policy lies in a. free exchange of views
as public issues. And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must
aJso be informed. For that. reason this Court has repeatedly stated that
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas
as well as the right of free expression." Saxbe v. Wa.shington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (PowELL, J., dissenting) .
21 See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government
26 (1948) :
"Just as far as . . . foe citizens who are to decide an issue a.re denied
acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be illconsidered, ill-balanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the Fir,st.
.Amendment to tne Consfitutiori is·directed.
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ern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge
gives." Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hurst ed.
1910) .
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free of governmental restraints. Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the operation
of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would
be stripped of its substance.22
For that reason information-gathering is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protection . See, e. g., BranzlYurg v.
Ha.yes, 408 U.S. 665 , 681; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 833.2 3
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protection is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest- and
importance.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co ., 297 U. S. 233, representatives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising
2 2 Admittedly, the right to receive or acquire information is not &
-pecifically mentioned in the Constitu tion. But "the protection of t he Bill of
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from . . . abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessa ry to,· make the
express gua rantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing a~herents are not free to receive
and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General,, 381 U. S., at
380 (BRENNAN , J ., concurring) . It would be an even more barren marketplace that had willing bu)rers and sellers and no meaningful inform ation
to exchange.
23 See also Branzburg v. Ha yes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J. , dissenting):
" No less important to t he news dissemination process is the gathering of
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for
without freedom to acquire information t he right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a .-right , to gather news, of
;some dimensions, must exist ."
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revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the
members of an organized society, united for their common
good, to impart and acquire information about their common
interests." Id., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle
in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisements-the so-called "taxes on knowledge":
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and
controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity
for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect
of their governmental affairs. . . . The aim of the struggle :[against those taxes] was ... to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.
Upon the correctness of this conclusion, the very characterizations of the exactions as 'taxes on knowledge' sheds
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an informed and enlightened public opinion was the thing at
stake." Id., at 247.
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle,
the Court held:
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.
The tax involved here is bad ... because, in light of its
history and its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate
and calculated device . . . to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties." Id., at 250.
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of the
public generally" 24 is also implicit in the doctrine that "newsSaxbe v. Wa_.shington Post Co., suprra, 417 U.S., a.t 864.
dis.senting.)
24

(POWELL,

J,,
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men have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v.
Procunier, supra, 417 U.S., at 834. In Pell it wa.s unnecessary
to consider the extent of the public's right of access to information regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate
the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both
directly and through the press, was adequate to survive constitutional cha.llenge; institutional considerations justified denying the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in
that case.
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner
portions of the Santa Rita -jail that existed on the date this
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of information at its source, abriclgea the public's right to be informed
about those conditions.
The answer to that question does not depend upon the
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political
branches of government.25 Moreover, there are unquestionably occasions when governmental activity may properly be
carried on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and
the press are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceed25 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 n. 15, we pointed out
that the Founders themselves followed a policy of confidentiality:
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete
privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
pp xi-xxv (1911) . Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed
for more than 30 years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong.,
1st Sess., Res. 8 ( 1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that without
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been .
written.. C .. Warren , The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937) ."
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ings, our own conferences, [and] the meetings of other official
bodies gathering in executive session . . . . " Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 834."' 0
In addition , some functions of government----essential to
the protection of the public and indeed our country's vital
interests-necessarily require a large measure of secrecy, subject to appropriate legislative oversight. 2 ' In such situa.t ions
the reasons for withholding information from the public are
both apparent and legitimate.
In this case, however, "[r] espondents do not assert a right
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in
any way the decisionmaking processes of governmental officials." 28 They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of
concealing prison conditions from the public. Those conditions are wholly without claim to confidentiality. While prison
,n In the case of grand jury proceedings, for example, the secrecy rule
has been justified on several grounds:
" ( 1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the gra.nd jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later
appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled djsclosures by persons who have infonnation with respect to
the commission of crimes; ( 5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of
guilt." United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U. S. 677, 681 n. 6.
27 In United States v. Nixon, supra, we a11:10 recognjzed the valid need
for prot~ction of communications between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist. them in the performance of their ma.njfold
duties, explaining tha.t '·the importance of this confidentiality is too plain
to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who
expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper ca.ndor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." / d., at 705.
28 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co .. supra. 417 U. S., at 861 (POWELL, J .,
,dissentin_g) .
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officials have an interest in the time and manner of public
acquisition of information about the institutions they administer, there is no legitimate, penological justification for
concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow
citizens are being confined.'"0
The reasons which militate in favor of providing special
protection to the flow of information to the public about
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a democratic society. Not only are they public institutions; financed
with public funds and administered by public servants; 30
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system.
The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and sometimes
permanently, deprived of their liberty as a result of a trial
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By
express command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding
must be a "public trial. " ,n It is important not only that the
trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have
confidence in the integrity of the proceeding. 02 That public
The Court in Saxbe not<>d that "'prisons are institutions where public access is generally limited.'" 417 U. S., at 849 ( citation omitted) .
This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological interests served by regulating access, e. g., security and confinement. But concea.ling prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate
objectives.
30 "The administration of the:;e institutions, the effectiveness of their
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that they maintain,
and the experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters
of legitima.te societal interest and concern." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
supra, 417 U.S .. at 861 (PowELL, .J., dis:;enting) .
31 " In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en joy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and ·
·cause of the accusa tions . ..." U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
32 "The right t-0 a publi c trial is not only to protect the accused but to
protect as much t he public's right to kn,ow what goes on when men's lives
and liberty are at sta ke . ..." L ewis v. Peyton, 352•F. 2_d 791; 792 (CA4 ·
1965) . See also In re Oliver, 333 U._S. 25~-, 270: : "The knowledge that ·
29
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interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is
treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation. While a ward of the State and subject to its stern
discipline, he retains constitutional protections against cruel
and unusual punishment, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S.
97, a protection which may derive more practical support from
access to information about prisons by the public than by
occasional litigation in a busy court.'l 3
Some inmates-in Santa Rita, a substantial number-are
pretrial detainees. Though confined pending trial, they have
not been convicted of an offense against society and are
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain penological
objectives, i. e., punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation,
which are legitimate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inapplicable to pretrial detainees.a, Society has a special interest
in ensuring that unconvicted citizens are treated in accord with
their status.
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public
and the press had been consistently denied any access to the
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power:"
3 :i In fact, conditions within the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita
facility had been found to constitute cruel arid unusual punishment.
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). The
public's interest in ensuring that these conditions ha,ve been remedied is
apparent. For, in finru analysis, it is the citizens who bear responsibility
for the treatment accorded those confined within penal institutions.
34 "Incarceration after conviction is imposed to punish, to deter, and to
rehabilitate the convict. . . . Some freedom to accomplish these ends must
of necessity be afforded prison personnel. Conversely, where incarceration
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment,, and retribution
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is
but a temporary holding operation, and their necessa.ry freedom of action
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in stich a contaxt a.re
out of harmony with the presumption of ll\nocence." Anderson v. Nasser,
438 2d 183 1 190 (CA5 1971).
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inner portions of the Santa Rita jail, that there had been
excessive censorship of inmate correspondence, and that there
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow
of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether
respondent established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
did not depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to
special treatment beyond that accorded the public at large.
Rather, the probable existence of a constitutional violation
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic
community access to knowledge about how its servants were
treating some of its members who have been committed to
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of
information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." 5

III
Th e preliminary injunction entered by the District Court
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duties
on petitioner that may not be required by the Constitution
itself. The injunction was not an abuse of discretion for
either of these reasons.
If a litigant can prove that he has suffered specific harm
from the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is
entirely proper for a court to grant relief tailored to his needs
without attempting to redress all the mischief that the policy
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different
"" When fund am ental freedoms of citizens have been at stake, the Court
h~s recognized that aJ1 abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a
wide v::i riety of governmental policies. See, e. g., American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 ·u : S. 449 ;
Bo yd v. United Stat es,. 116 U . s·. 616 i' Grosjean v. American Press Co ., 297
U. S. 233·.

'
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methods of remedying a violation of that right may sometimes
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or
the other. Preliminary relief could therefore appropriately be
awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it was
affected by the challenged policy without also granting specific
relief to the general public. Indeed, since our adversary
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies
between specific litigants, it would have been improper for the
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who
have not requested sepa.rate relief. Accordingly, even though
the Constitution provides the press with no greater right of
r ~cess to information than that possessed by the public at
large. a preliminary injunction is not invalid simply because it
awards special relief to a successful litigant which is a representative of the press. 36
Nor is there anything novel about injunctive relief which
goes beyond a mere prohibition against repetition of previous
unlawful conduct. In situations which a.re both numerous and
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirmaa« Moreover, the relief granted to KQED will redound to the benefit, of
members of the public interested in obtaining information about conditions in the Santa Rita jail. The press may have no greater constitutional
right to information about prisons than that possessed by the genera.I publi c. But when the press does acquire information and disseminate it to
the public, it performs an important societal function.
" In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the publi c at large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of the
First Amendment." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., supra, 417 U. S., a.t
863-864 (POWELL, J., dissenting) .
See abo Branzburg v. Hayes. supra, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J.,
dissenting).
In the context of fashioning a remedy for a violation of rights protected
·by the First Amendment, consideration of the role of the press in our
·~ciety is appropriate.

•
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tive steps to eliminate the effects of a violation of law even
though the law itself imposes no duty to take the remedial
action decreed by the court. 37 It follows that if prison regulations and policies have unconstitutionally suppressed information and interfered with communication in violation of the
First Amendment, the District Court has the power to require,
at least temporarily, that the channels of communication be
opened more widely than the law would otherwise require in
order to let relevant facts, which may have been concealed,
come to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of
that preliminarily awarded in this case would be "aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation ," Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, it is perfectly
clear that the court had power to enter an injunction which
was broader than a mere prohibition against illegal conduct.
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the·
specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor
is it appropriate for this Court to review the scope of the
order.38 The order was preliminary in character, and would
have b~en subject to revision before the litigation rnac~ final
conclus1011.
I respectfully dissent.

37 For an extensive discussion of this practice in the context of desegregation decrees, see the Court's opinion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U. S. 267.
38 It should be noted, however, that the District Court was presented with
substant ial evidence indicatin g t hat the u:;e of cameras and interviews with
randomly selected in,mates neither jeopardized security nor threatened
legitima.te penological interests in other prisons where such access was.,
_permitted.. See Proc1;.nier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U. S., at, 414 n. 14.~
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June 16, 1978

Re:

76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED

Dear Lewis:
I have added the following at the end of
n. 29 on p. 18 of the printed draft:
"Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
U.S.
, decided this Term, does not
suggest a contrary conclusion. The effect ~
of the Court's decision in that case was
to limit the access by the electronic
media to the Nixon tapes to that enjoyed
by the press and the public at the time
of the trial.
That case presented 'no
question of a truncated flow of information
to the public.'" Id., at
I hope this is acceptable.
Respectfully,

; \,L
Mr. Justice Powell

Houchins v. KQED

name to your dissent.
Sjncerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
The Conference

joining vou

is

firm,

you added a note aJ ong t _h e ~Jines . of
There may appear - to thP. casuaJ
there is some tension between what I wr.ote in Nixon (see

pp. J9-20) of the slip opinion) and what :r: agree with ; ln
your fine opinion in this :.case. ~ ·· •
•
L. P. P. ;, Jr.

...,- ,

Ho.bins

adding, as a footnote at some appropriate place,
substance of the following:

In Nixon v. Warner Comumnications, Inc., No.
76-944, decided this Term, the effect of the Court's
decision was to limit the access by the electronic media to
the Nixon tapes to that enjoyed by the press and the public
at the time of the trial.

That case is not relevant here

as it involved an accommodation between the common law
right of access to judicial records and the Presidential
Recordings Act.

Moreover, the Nixon case presented "no

question of a truncated flow of information to the
public.": Slip op., at 19.
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Dear Chief:
I am still with you.
sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.
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RE:

No. 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., et al.

Dear John:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

;0
Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The conference
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

June 16, 1978

From: Jim Alt

✓

Re: Justice Stevens' dissent in No. 76-1310, Houchins v.
KQED.

I have compared the old and new versions of this opinion,
checked with Justice Stevens' clerk, and concluded that
there are no substantive changes.
I also have reviewed pp. 19-20 of your opinion for
the Court in No. 76-944, Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,

attached hereto.

Although I sense some

tension

between statements there to the effect that the press

-

has no greater right of access to information - at least
about a trial - than does the

general public, that case

easily is distinguishable from this one on two grounds.
First, and to my mind most importantly, both the press
and the public already had been given substantial access

-

to the contents of the tapes at issue in Nixon.

As you .

wrote, "There is no question of a truncated flow of
information to the public." Slip op., at 19.

Second, it

could be argued that the district court had a countervail
interest in controlling and keeping track of its exhibits

nr

that outweighed the press' interest in that particular
form of access.
Although I would be a little happier if Justice Stevens'

-

opinion noted these distinctions, I think they are obvious
disinterested
enough that a
/
observer would conclude you have
taken positions that are entirely consistent in the two cases.
JA
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